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THE FUTURE OF POLYAMOROUS MARRIAGE:
LESSONS FROM THE MARRIAGE
EQUALITY STRUGGLE
HADAR AVIRAM* & GWENDOLYN M. LEACHMAN**†‡
Amidst the recent legal victories and growing public support for same-
sex marriage, numerous polyamorous individuals have expressed interest in
pursuing legal recognition for marriages between more than two consenting
adults. This Article explores the possibilities that exist for such a poly-
amorous marriage equality campaign, in light of the theoretical literature
on law and social movements, as well as our own original and secondary
research on polyamorous and LGBT communities. Among other issues, we
examine the prospect of prioritizing the marriage struggle over other forms
of nonmarital relationship recognition; pragmatic regulative challenges,
like taxation, healthcare, and immigration; and how law and culture shape
these struggles and their ability to produce social change.
We argue that legal mobilization for same-sex marriage has produced
conflicting pressures for contemporary polyamorous activism. On one hand,
same-sex marriage litigation has provided several doctrinal footholds for
expanding marriage to polyamorous relationships. On the other hand, same-
sex marriage litigation has simultaneously reinforced cultural stigmas
against polyamorous relationships—stigmas that constrain the practical
utility of those legal tools (especially as means for implementing broader
social change beyond the letter of the law). By accounting for these conflict-
ing legal and cultural pressures, this Article provides a comprehensive
roadmap of the issues, strategies, and challenges likely to emerge along the
path toward polyamorous marriages.
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The radical of one century is the conservative of the next. The rad-
ical invents the views. When he has worn them out, the conserva-
tive adopts them.1
INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2013, hundreds of San Franciscans swarmed excitedly into
City Hall in the early morning hours.2 Giant video screens were positioned
for the audience’s benefit to capture the Supreme Court decision announce-
ments of that morning in two important cases: United States v. Windsor,3
addressing the constitutionality of the federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), and Hollingsworth v. Perry,4 addressing the viability of Califor-
nia’s Proposition 8. City Hall had been Ground Zero for the latter legal chal-
lenge; in 2004, then-Mayor Gavin Newsom opened its doors to same-sex
couples seeking to get married, in violation of a then-existing California stat-
ute forbidding same-sex marriages.5 The San Francisco Superior Court found
the statute to be unconstitutional.6 Shortly thereafter, in 2008, voters passed
Proposition 8, a California constitutional amendment forbidding same-sex
marriage.7 In 2010, Judge Vaughn Walker found Prop 8 unconstitutional.8
1 MARK TWAIN AT YOUR FINGERTIPS: A BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 393 (Caroline
Thomas Harnsberger ed., Dover Publ’ns 2012) (1948).
2 Matthew S. Bajko & Lisa Keen, Court Victories!, BAY AREA REP., June 27, 2013,
archived at http://perma.cc/PT96-795Q. The first author attended this occasion at City
Hall.
3 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
4 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
5 San Francisco Weds Gay Couples, CNN (Feb. 12, 2004), archived at http://
web.archive.org/web/20040609103629/http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/02/12/
gay.marriage.california.ap/.
6 In re Coordination Proceeding, Special Title Rule 1550(c), No. 4365, 2005 WL
583129, at *12 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005).
7 For a discussion of the passage of Proposition 8 and the lawsuits surrounding it, see
generally Scott Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57
UCLA L. REV. 1235 (2010).
8 See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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The State of California did not appeal the ruling,9 and when the initiative’s
proponents continued the struggle to prevent same-sex marriages,10 the Su-
preme Court ruled they had no standing to do so.11
As the decisions in both cases were announced on CNN, spectators ex-
citedly exclaimed and squealed.12 The combined effects of the decisions—
the first declaring Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional,13 the second putting
an end to the barriers to same-sex marriage in California on procedural
grounds14—would be that thousands of San Franciscan couples could marry,
and that same-sex marriages in states that allowed them would be fully rec-
ognized by the federal government, including for purposes of taxation,
health care, and immigration.15 Former Mayor Newsom, Mayor Ed Lee, City
Attorney Dennis Herrera, and Phyllis Lyon, the original petitioner in the
marriage cases and the first person to be married at City Hall to her female
partner, came down the stairs, welcomed by deafening applause and
cheers.16 As the joyous news sank in, celebrations outside City Hall began,
later to continue in the Castro, San Francisco’s historical gay neighborhood.17
This account of Windsor and Perry exemplifies several of the extralegal
outcomes of legal mobilization, which previous socio-legal scholarship has
examined in detail.18 The public celebrations around the recent Supreme
Court decisions—echoing the alternating rounds of celebration and protest
in response to marriage decisions in previous years—illustrate how marriage
equality litigation has sparked renewed interest and popular participation in
LGBT politics. Same-sex marriage and relationship recognition litigation
have also helped to reconstruct the dominant cultural meanings associated
with marriage, bringing same-sex couples within its ambit.19 Since the
9 Press Release, State of Cal. Dep’t of Justice Office of the Att’y Gen., Attorney
General Kamala D. Harris Issues Statement on Prop. 8 Arguments (Mar. 26, 2013),
archived at http://perma.cc/BH52-RYPS.
10 Bob Egelko, High Court Won’t Order State to Defend Prop 8, S.F. CHRON., Sept.
9, 2010, archived at http://perma.cc/5JBD-UUZF.
11 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2652–53 (2013).
12 Bajko & Keen, supra note 2. R
13 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).
14 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659.
15 See generally After DOMA, LAMBDA LEGAL, archived at http://perma.cc/C8JY-
83H2 (summarizing the consequences of Windsor); Frequently Asked Questions: Defense
of Marriage Act (DOMA), GLAAD, archived at http://perma.cc/9K3U-SB3Z (same).
16 Bajko & Keen, supra note 2. R
17 Jim Wilson, Joy, and Dismay, as the Supreme Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
2013, archived at http://perma.cc/KM4E-N2UM (depicting a celebration in the Castro
neighborhood in photo 8).
18 See, e.g., MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 5–6 (1994) (including broad changes in public policies
and social practices in the analysis of legal mobilization); Marc Galanter, The Radiating
Effects of Courts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUT COURTS 117 (Keith O. Boyum & Lynn
Mather eds., 1983) (examining the flow of influence outward from courts).
19 Cf. KATHLEEN E. HULL, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF LOVE
AND LAW 76 (2006) (“As . . . excluded [same-sex couples] appropriate those elements of
the institution that are least easily restricted (in the case of marriage, its cultural prac-
tices), the institution itself begins to transform.”).
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LGBT civil rights organizations came to prioritize marriage litigation, public
acceptance for same-sex marriage has risen dramatically, from 27% in
March 1996 to 53% in May 2013.20 The litigation campaign for same-sex
marriage has also resulted in a rising tide of legal victories on the issue,21
creating formal rights that many same-sex couples around the nation benefit
from directly. Even acknowledging the strong criticisms marriage litigation
has evoked, both among antigay conservatives and within the LGBT com-
munity itself,22 most people would probably agree that the legal mobilization
around marriage has invigorated the LGBT movement and has improved the
situation of many sexual minorities in a predominantly heterosexual society.
Missing from this standard celebratory account of marriage equality lit-
igation is an assessment of an entirely different class of extralegal effects—
specifically, the effects that marriage equality litigation may have produced
for sexual minority communities outside the context of the LGBT move-
ment. Indeed, this is an oversight of the legal mobilization literature more
broadly. While significant work has been done to examine the extralegal
impact of legal mobilization on the specific constituencies whose legal rights
are formally implicated, there has been little empirical research into the im-
pact of legal mobilization on other, related social groups, or the conditions
under which such an impact is most likely to occur. This oversight is particu-
larly surprising given that the legal constructs evoked through legal mobili-
zation (e.g., marriage, rights, equality) tend to resonate with a broad array
of non-movement actors23—suggesting that a movement’s politiciza-
20 Marriage, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/117328/marriage.aspx, archived at
http://perma.cc/BAG6-L3RB. By July 2013, after the Windsor and Perry decisions, the
percentage of supporters rose to 54%. Id.
21 Since the Supreme Court’s Windsor and Perry decisions in June 2013, there have
been sixty-five rulings against state bans on same-sex marriage. Marriage Rulings in the
Courts, FREEDOM TO MARRY, archived at http://perma.cc/C2S8-G4TJ (documenting
same-sex marriage cases since June 2013, current as of March 2, 2015).
22 Among the critiques of marriage within the LGBTQ community are its tendency to
pressure LGB assimilation into state-favored dyadic, monogamous couplings, see Blair
McVicar, Forget Same-Sex Marriage, Heteronormativity is the Real Problem, LITERATI
CO. (Nov. 21, 2013), http://literatico.com/features-and-opinion/the-gender-card/forget-
sex-marriage-heteronormativity-real-problem, archived at http://perma.cc/8X4R-86XV,
and that winning marriage benefits is most relevant to the LGBT community’s white and
wealthy segments (rather than the poor and of color segments of the community), which
are most likely to form marital relationships, see Marcus Anthony Hunter, Race and the
Same-Sex Marriage Divide, 12 CONTEXTS 74, 74–75 (2013).
23 See HULL, supra note 19, at 76 (“The cultural practices that partially constitute R
marriage have a strong pull on many people, including some who are excluded from
marriage as a legal institution. This is true not only of contemporary same-sex couples,
but of other excluded relationships as well. American slaves were forbidden legal mar-
riage but constructed wedding rituals for themselves outside the law. And polygamists,
both historically and in the present, draw on the cultural trappings of marriage to enact
their ‘plural marriages,’ despite the absence of legal recognition and even the threat of
criminal prosecution.”).
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tion of these terms is likely to generate “spillover” effects in other social
groups.24
This Article addresses the idea of legal mobilization “spillover” by ex-
amining the implications of the LGBT movement’s marriage equality cam-
paign for a sympathetic, but distinct, sexual minority group: the
polyamorous community. Polyamorous (or “poly”) relationships are sexu-
ally intimate relationships between three or more consenting adults. The
polyamorous community distinguishes itself from the religious variant of
multiparty relationships, polygamy, in its members’ ethical commitment to
nonmonogamy25 and acceptance of queer sexualities. Many in the poly com-
munity also view the LGBT community as a natural affinity group—so
much so that politicized poly activists have historically restrained them-
selves politically to avoid stepping on the toes of LGBT activists.26 In 2005,
this Article’s first author conducted an ethnography of Bay Area poly-
amorous activists and found reluctance to pursue legal avenues, among other
reasons, out of fear of sabotaging the marriage equality struggle.27 Yet the
increasingly victorious legal mobilization around same-sex marriage appears
to have emboldened activists to speak out on the issue. For example, Tobi
Hill-Meyer of Seattle expressed her complex feelings in reaction to Windsor
and Perry in her blog post, titled “I Still Can’t Marry My Partner”:28
However, in your celebrations I want to ask one teeny little
favor of you. Please don’t say “all couples have the freedom to
marry” or “We finally have marriage equality.” . . . [E]ven in
states with same sex-marriage [sic], the statement that “everyone
can get married now” is just not true. I live in Seattle, and have
been hearing this a lot since our state passed same-sex marriage
last November. . . . But you see, here’s the thing: I still can’t marry
24 See David S. Meyer & Nancy Whittier, Social Movement Spillover, 41 SOC.
PROBLEMS 277, 277 (1994) (analyzing mechanisms of transmission of ideas, tactics,
style, participants, and organizations between movements).
25 See Elizabeth Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Poly-
amorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 283 (2004) (“Polyamory is
a lifestyle embraced by a minority of individuals who exhibit a wide variety of relation-
ship models and who articulate an ethical vision that I understand to encompass five main
principles: self-knowledge, radical honesty, consent, self-possession, and privileging love
and sex over other emotions and activities such as jealousy.”). Note, however, that prac-
tices constituting polyamory can be quite distinct. See Christian Klesse, Polyamory: Inti-
mate Practice, Identity or Sexual Orientation?, 17 SEXUALITIES 81, 89 (2014) (“As a
relational practice, polyamory sustains a vast variety of open relationship or multi-partner
constellations, which can differ in definition and grades of intensity, closeness and
commitment.”).
26 Hadar Aviram, Make Love, Not Law: Perceptions of the Marriage Equality Strug-
gle Among Polyamorous Activists, 7 J. BISEXUALITY 261, 273–74 (2008) [hereinafter
Aviram, Make Love, Not Law].
27 Id. at 273.
28 Tobi Hill-Meyer, I Still Can’t Marry My Partner, BILERICO PROJECT (June 28,
2013), http://www.bilerico.com/2013/06/i_still_cant_marry_my_partner.php, archived at
http://perma.cc/V2RU-HAKD.
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my partner of 8 years, Ronan Kelly. Because it would mean I
couldn’t be married to my partner of 15, Fay Onyx.
I know, I know, the marriage movement doesn’t want to talk
about poly families at all. I’ve accepted that none of you are going
to fight for my marriage to be considered equal. It’s been bashed
over my head forever that I’m not even supposed to talk about my
relationships because we are the evil end of the slippery slope
along with bestiality and pedophilia. I’m not asking for you to fight
for my rights. I’m just asking you not to pretend that everyone has
the right to marry when my family can’t even get a civil union.29
Hill-Meyer is not alone; there seems to be a growing interest within the
polyamorous community in legal recognition for multiparty relationships. In
a 2012 survey conducted by the polyamorous magazine Loving More and the
National Coalition for Sexual Freedom (NCSF), yielding 4062 responses
from respondents ranging in age from 16 to 92, 65.9% of respondents said
they would take advantage of plural marriage if it were legally available.30
While the Loving More survey did find considerable ambivalence regarding
governmental interference in relationships,31 a sentiment also reflected in the
first author’s 2005 ethnographic work,32 the survey suggests that the poly
community’s ambivalence toward marriage is now coupled with newfound
enthusiasm for legal mobilization, possibly in light of the successes of the
LGBT community.
29 Id. Recounting the health care and immigration challenges of her multipartner fam-
ily, and those of friends, Hill-Meyer adds:
I look at giddy proposals and declarations of love on Facebook and I have to
admit, it stings to see so many friends being recognized in a way that I can’t. It
makes me want that too. Maybe not as much as I want an end of police profiling
and harassment of queer youth, people of color, and trans women, but I definitely
want it.
When I hear “Everyone can marry their partner now” and I have to add “ex-
cept me” silently in my head, a little part of me is crushed. I swallow my tears
and mumble something about marriage being just a piece of paper and try to get
on with my day.
I’m not asking you to stop celebrating, or even to fight for my rights the same
way I’ve fought for yours. But maybe you could avoid erasing me with your
words. Maybe you could remember that we’re not all equal yet. Certainly not in
terms of employment, voting rights, or the criminalization of poverty. And not
even in terms of marriage.
Id.
30 What Do Polys Want?: An Overview of the 2012 Loving More Survey, LOVING
MORE (June 21, 2012), http://www.lovemore.com/polyamory-articles/2012-lovingmore-
polyamory-survey/, archived at http://perma.cc/9XSZ-KEGL.
31 The Loving More survey reported that 66.9% of respondents thought that no rela-
tionship structure “deserve[d] special recognition,” indicating ambivalence about the
privilege of marriage in general. Id. Part I discusses a similar ambivalence in the pre-
1993 LGBT movement and argues that it was not incompatible with activists’ concerted
political efforts demanding marriage equality at that time.
32 Aviram, Make Love, Not Law, supra note 26, at 274–75, 277–80. R
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\38-2\HLG202.txt unknown Seq: 7  3-JUN-15 13:31
2015] The Future of Polyamorous Marriage 275
While same-sex marriage litigation may have opened the door to an
emulative multiparty marriage campaign, it has simultaneously undercut the
potential for this campaign to be effective (at least in the short term). Same-
sex marriage advocates have strategically drawn a clear boundary between
the struggle for same-sex marriage and a possible struggle for multiparty
marriage. This rhetorical move is typically made to address the “slippery
slope” arguments by conservatives that expanding marriage to same-sex
couples would lead to further expansions for bigamy, polygamy, and in-
cest.33 The following vignette provides a recent example of the slippery slope
argument, as presented by Justice Sonia Sotomayor in the oral arguments of
Hollingsworth v. Perry, followed by the defensive response by attorney Ted
Olson, who represented the same-sex couples:
Justice Sotomayor: If you say that marriage is a fundamental right,
what State restrictions could ever exist? Meaning, what State re-
strictions [would remain] with respect to the number of people . . .
that could get married [or] the incest laws[?] . . . I can accept that
the State has probably an overbearing interest on—on protecting a
child until they’re of age to marry, but what’s left?
Mr. Olson: Well, you’ve said—you’ve said in the cases decided by
this Court that the polygamy issue, multiple marriages raises ques-
tions about exploitation, abuse, patriarchy, issues with respect to
taxes, inheritance, child custody, it is an entirely different thing.
And if you—if a State prohibits polygamy, it’s prohibiting con-
duct. If it prohibits gay and lesbian citizens from getting married,
it is prohibiting their exercise of a right based upon their status.34
Instead of defending multiparty marriage, Olson reaffirms the general ten-
dency among same-sex marriage supporters to insist that same-sex marriage
would not lead to multiparty marriage—implicitly accepting the devaluation
of multiparty relationships that the slippery slope arguments entail. Olson’s
response also subscribes to common stereotypes that multiparty marriages
33 For example, social conservative Rick Santorum stated in 2003 that:
If the Supreme Court says that you have the right to consensual (gay) sex within
your home, then you have the right to bigamy, you have the right to polygamy,
you have the right to incest, you have the right to adultery. You have the right to
anything . . . [w]hether it’s polygamy, whether it’s adultery, whether it’s sodomy,
all of those things, are antithetical to a healthy, stable, traditional family.
Excerpt from Santorum Interview, USA TODAY (Apr. 22, 2003), archived at http://perma
.cc/6Z8V-5KZV. Santorum reiterated this view at a public appearance in New Hamp-
shire. Sandhya Somashekhar, Rick Santorum Compares Same-Sex Marriage to Polygamy,
in Spirited Exchange at N.H. College, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2012, archived at http://perma
.cc/BNH7-33FJ.
34 Transcript of Oral Argument at 46–47, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2013) (No. 12-144), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_trans
cripts/12-144a.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5YEK-UXTE.
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generate “exploitation, abuse, patriarchy,” but presents no data to support
this assumption.35
Aside from creating thorny legal precedent for future multiparty mar-
riage activists to confront, arguments like Olson’s also create more immedi-
ate social repercussions for polyamorous communities. To begin with, these
arguments have embittered many polyamory activists who once supported
the same-sex marriage struggle. These instances dovetail with surveys of
LGBT people finding a majority of participants objecting to legal recogni-
tion for relationships between more than two adults.36 The LGBT move-
ment’s simultaneous politicization of marriage and erection of a clear
rhetorical wedge between same-sex and multiparty relationships may have
even reinforced the stigmatization of multiparty relationships and
nonmonogamous families.
This Article explores the future of marriages between more than two
consenting adults, in light of the theoretical literature on law and social
movements, as well as our own original and secondary research on poly-
amorous and LGBT communities. A motivating question in this research is
how legal mobilization for same-sex marriage has constrained the set of le-
gal and extralegal strategies available to advocates of multiparty marriage—
while potentially enabling other directions for advocacy. Previous legal and
sociological literature has shown how particular social movement strategies
(typically those that are viewed as most successful) tend to become en-
grained into a standard “toolkit” of political tactics that are borrowed from
movement to movement.37 Our project builds on this idea of diffusion or
“spillover” among movement strategies. However, instead of showing how
effective strategies travel, our work considers how movement actors’ very
perceptions of a strategy’s effectiveness may be shaped by a prior move-
ment’s legal mobilization. Specifically, we examine how a prior movement’s
35 Olson’s response also draws a distinction between “conduct” and “the exercise of
a right based upon status” that is murky at best. After all, marriage—between partners of
any number or gender—is a type of “conduct.” Furthermore, whether or not prohibitions
on multiparty marriages are based on status depends upon whether polyamory (or one’s
polyamorous orientation) is a status—and at least some commentators have argued that it
could be perceived as such. See generally Ann E. Tweedy, Polyamory as a Sexual Orien-
tation, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1461 (2011) (arguing that the definition of sexual orientation
should be expanded to include polyamory).
36 See The Advocate Poll, ADVOCATE, July 4, 2006, at 10.
37 See, e.g., Doug McAdam & Dieter Rucht, The Cross-National Diffusion of Move-
ment Ideas, 528 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 56, 58 (1993) (examining the
spread of movement tactics and ideas across national lines); David S. Meyer & Steven A.
Boutcher, Signals and Spillover: Brown v. Board of Education and Other Social Move-
ments, 5 PERSP. ON POL. 81, 82 (2007) (analyzing the effect of judicial responses to the
Civil Rights Movement on subsequent social movements); Meyer & Whittier, supra note
24, at 287 (discussing how successful tactical innovations developed by one social move- R
ment become part of a “collective action repertoire” upon which subsequent movements
draw); Verta Taylor & Nella Van Dyke, “Get Up, Stand Up”: Tactical Repertoires of
Social Movements, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 262 (David
A. Snow, et al. eds., 2004) (analyzing both the political and cultural outcomes of protest
tactics).
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legal mobilization campaign can potentially restructure the legal and cultural
environments in which subsequent movements mobilize—shaping various
strategies’ likelihood for producing success and thus their attractiveness as
tools for social change.
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides a detailed analysis of
the early history of same-sex marriage advocacy within the LGBT move-
ment. It discusses an initial radical form of same-sex marriage advocacy that
existed among self-identified “gay liberationists” of the 1970s. This radical
marriage advocacy was made possible by the low likelihood of gay libera-
tionists actually making legal headway on their demands through the courts
or legislatures; in this environment, same-sex marriage activists used litiga-
tion as a form of protest—as a way to draw visibility to activists’ resistance
to heterosexual marriage laws.38 As the political climate shifted and LGBT
activists grew more conservative in their approach, gay and lesbian civil
rights groups pursued more attainable forms of nonmarital relationship rec-
ognition, creating increasing legal precedent and cultural visibility for mar-
riage-like gay relationships. Then, in 1992, a case brought by a private
attorney in Hawaii generated the first successful challenge to a state ban on
same-sex marriage, signaling that marriage had come within same-sex
couples’ reach.39 This Hawaii case ushered in the contemporary era of mar-
riage equality litigation, involving a coordinated effort by mainstream LGBT
civil rights organizations to demand constitutional protections for same-sex
marriage outright.
Part II takes a direct look at the polyamorous community today. It pro-
vides a brief background on the emergence of polyamory as an alternative
form of intimate relationships, including its ideological foundations in queer
and feminist theory (contrasting polyamory from the better known religious
form of nonmonogamy, polygamy). We discuss the ties that exist between
the poly and LGBT communities, arguing that despite the minimal direct
interaction between poly and LGBT constituencies, poly activists have
shown a sense of allegiance to LGBT activism and support for LGBT move-
ment goals. Finally, Part II performs a direct comparison between the con-
temporary poly community and the early “gay liberation” days of LGBT
activism. We highlight the numerous parallels between these communities,
including internal values (individualism, antisubordinationist views, antias-
similationist politics) and external political forces (invisibility, “un-
thinkability” of state relationship recognition), which make these
communities ripe for comparative study.
Part III turns to examining the decades-long LGBT legal mobilization
for marital and nonmarital relationship recognition, and specifically, how
38 See generally Michael Boucai, Glorious Precedents: When Gay Marriage Was
Radical, 27 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 101 (forthcoming 2015) (discussing how early same-
sex marriage cases pursued radical political agendas).
39 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), superseded by constitutional amend-
ment, HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.
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this legal mobilization has shaped the cultural and legal climate in which
today’s poly community is operating. In general, this analysis suggests that
the LGBT legal mobilization may have produced conflicting pressures for
contemporary poly activism. While same-sex marriage litigation has created
greater traction for legal arguments to expand marriage to poly relationships,
it may have simultaneously reinforced cultural stigmas against polyamorous
relationships. We propose a set of insights for poly activism in light of this
current situation, including the strategies polyamorous activists could bor-
row (or avoid), the reactions poly activists should expect to face, and the
specific lessons they might learn from the LGBT experience.
Part IV then examines the implications of our analysis for legal and
sociological theories of social movements. It uses the analysis in Part II as a
springboard for theorizing aspects of social movement “spillover,” or the
“nature of movement-movement influence,”40 that previous work has not yet
considered. While it is well known that social movements borrow strategies
from one another, less is known about how movements with only weak com-
mon activist networks or rarely engage in coalition work come to influence
one another.41 This Article contributes to this literature by positing a range of
structural factors and community conditions that enable the flow of strate-
gies (in this case, relationship recognition strategies) among subordinated
social groups. Further, this Article expands on previous socio-legal work
examining the numerous “radiating effects” of litigation beyond the direct
constituency formally affected by that litigation.42 In particular, we suggest
that same-sex marriage legal mobilization has raised several extralegal con-
sequences, including changes in cultural expectations and definitions of mar-
riage, intimacy, and the role of law in social change, likely to have spillover
effects for poly politics and beyond. We suggest several important directions
for future research.
We conclude by reviewing the practical implications of this Article and
providing a roadmap of issues, strategies, and challenges that advocates can
use in the path toward polyamorous marriages. We think that the struggle for
marriage equality could be a step in the path toward the legal recognition of
multiple relationships, and that polyamorous activists mobilizing for legal
change have much to learn from the marriage equality struggle. However,
our approach in this paper is unique in that it does not privilege “winning”
40 Meyer & Whittier, supra note 24, at 278. R
41 Although there is evidence that many poly people have sexual relationships with
members of the same gender, there is little visible overlap among LGBT and poly-
amorous political movements. See infra Part II.A. This may be on account of the inten-
tional exclusion of polyamorous activists from LGBT political and community events.
See, e.g., Ana Cristina Santos, Intimacy in Times of (De)normalisation: Same-Sex Rela-
tional Recognition in Portugal, in MAPPING INTIMACIES: RELATIONS, EXCHANGES, AF-
FECTS 209, 218 (Tam Sanger & Yvette Taylor eds., 2013).
42 See generally MCCANN, supra note 18 (including broad changes in public policies R
and social practices in the analysis of legal mobilization); Galanter, supra note 18 (exam- R
ining the flow of influence outward from courts).
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as the ultimate goal of litigation and marker of success. Rather, our purpose
in analyzing the multiple phases of LGBT movement litigation is to offer a
variety of strategic models for litigation, which speak to different visions of
polyamorous community values and politics. The “impact litigation”
model43 that defines contemporary same-sex marriage litigation is just one
vision of relationship-recognition litigation; we leave it up to polyamorous
activists themselves to decide whether to implement such a strategy, or
whether to part ways with LGBT activists and forge their own path toward
legal acknowledgment of their relationships and families.
A note on terminology is in order before we proceed. Throughout this
Article, we have attempted to avoid anachronism by characterizing the
LGBT movement by the terms that were most widely used at the time. Ac-
cordingly, we refer to the “gay liberation” movement when speaking of ac-
tivism in the 1970s; to the “gay and lesbian” movement or “queer activists/
organizations” when speaking of activism in the 1980s; and to the “LGBT”
movement when speaking of activism from the 1990s onward. When dis-
cussing specific communities rather than the movement, we have made
every effort to balance our desire for inclusivity with the need for accuracy.
Because marriage equality challenges exclusionary marriage laws that pri-
marily burden people of non-heterosexual sexual orientations, we refer to the
individuals targeted by marriage equality advances as “LGB” people.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE ACTIVISM
While contemporary same-sex marriage advocacy has been
spearheaded by the well-funded, national civil rights groups in the LGBT
movement’s mainstream, same-sex marriage has historically been on much
shakier grounds as a movement objective. This Part provides an account of
the radical roots of same-sex marriage activism in the LGBT movement. It
traces how the meaning of marriage, and its desirability among LGBT activ-
ists, has shifted alongside broader changes in the movement’s dominant or-
ganizing strategies and political philosophies over the past several decades.
Same-sex marriage was originally championed by locally organized
“gay liberationists” of the 1970s as a bold and confrontational assertion of
gay empowerment. A farfetched goal at the time, marriage soon became
43 Impact litigation is a model of social change litigation that involves “[t]est cases
and planned litigation [which] often seek favorable judicial precedent or judicial orders
requiring changes to political or social institutions that redress inequality or relieve
marginalized groups from oppressive burdens.” Scott Barclay & Anna-Maria Marshall,
Supporting a Cause, Developing a Movement, and Consolidating a Practice: Cause Law-
yers and Sexual Orientation Litigation in Vermont, in THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS
MAKE: STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN LEGAL PRACTICE 171, 174 (Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold eds., 2005) (citing John Kilwein, Still Trying: Cause Lawyering for the Poor
and Disadvantaged in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COM-
MITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 181 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold,
eds., 1998)).
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subordinated to more attainable forms of relationship recognition as a new
cadre of national gay and lesbian civil rights organizations rose to promi-
nence. As those civil rights organizations directed an increasingly large
share of the movement’s resources into incremental law reform efforts, some
activists on the fringe resurrected the marriage issue, in outright defiance of
the mainstream gay and lesbian groups’ cautious suppression of the issue. It
was not until the mid-1990s when Baehr v. Lewin44 proved that same-sex
marriage was within the movement’s reach that marriage assumed its current
position as a centerpiece in the mainstream LGBT movement’s agenda.
A. Gay Liberation and Marriage Litigation as Protest
An unprecedented surge in political activity among gay men and lesbi-
ans occurred in the late 1960s.45 Drawing on the same progressive current
that animated leftist organizing in the feminist and black civil rights move-
ments of the day, self-identified “gay liberationists” formed predominantly
local, identity-based organizations in cities around the United States.46 While
gay liberation marked the first time a national common sense of purpose
emerged from gay and lesbian political organizing,47 gay liberationist groups
were far from uniform in their political approaches or in the goals they es-
poused.48 Among the diverse goals these groups pursued were: fostering gay
pride and empowerment; promoting the equality of LGB individuals vis-à-
vis straight people; broadening sexual freedom; disrupting binary gender ex-
pectations; and ridding society of homophobia and patriarchy.49
Gay liberationist politics was also novel in its embrace of confronta-
tional tactics. The predecessors of gay liberation, known as the “homophile”
movement, had generally employed a much more conservative approach in
attempts to avoid grabbing unwanted publicity.50 Gay liberationists, by con-
44 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), superseded by constitutional amendment, HAW. CONST.
art. I, § 23.
45 The number of gay-identified organizations went from about 50 in 1969 to over
800 in 1973. John D’Emilio, Cycles of Change, Questions of Strategy: The Gay and Les-
bian Movement After Fifty Years, in THE POLITICS OF GAY RIGHTS 31, 35 (Craig A.
Rimmerman, et al. eds., 2000).
46 AMIN GHAZIANI, THE DIVIDENDS OF DISSENT: HOW CONFLICT AND CULTURE
WORK IN LESBIAN AND GAY MARCHES ON WASHINGTON 30 (2008).
47 See Elizabeth A. Armstrong, From Struggle to Settlement: The Crystallization of a
Field of Lesbian/Gay Organizations in San Francisco 1969–1973, in SOCIAL MOVE-
MENTS AND ORGANIZATION THEORY 161, 161, 172 (Gerald Davis et al. eds., 2005).
48 “Indeed, in the early years of gay liberation, the movement suffered from splin-
tered views over what did constitute the primary goal. Was it, as some argued, to gain the
same sort of rights enjoyed by heterosexuals . . . ? Or was the goal, as the more radical
forces argued, to gain the right to be our different selves (in which case arguments needed
to be made in direct support of the sexual interests that were at the core of our differ-
ence)?” PATRICIA CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND COURTS IN THE
LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 91–92 (2000).
49 See Boucai, supra note 38, at 110. R
50 See Mary Bernstein, Identities and Politics: Toward a Historical Understanding of
the Lesbian and Gay Movement, 26 SOC. SCI. HIST. 531, 541 (2002).
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trast, defiantly marched in the streets and tried to attract attention through
disruptive public action: the Stonewall riots that occurred in June 1969, mo-
tivated by a police raid of a New York City bar frequented by LGB and
transgender patrons, are representative of this confrontational approach.51 Far
from being an isolated event or the first major LGBT political mobilization,
the Stonewall riots were one of many fiery public uprisings that emerged in
the late 1960s.52 Stonewall and similar uprisings were both inspired by and
reinforced by the radicalizing trend of gay liberationist politics at the time.53
A surge of activism around marriage equality arose from the new gay
liberationist politics.54 Interestingly, this issue received some national atten-
tion outside of concerted gay liberationist activism in the early 1970s, during
congressional deliberations regarding the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).55
While the ERA was ostensibly about constitutionalizing antidiscrimination
rights for women,56 conservatives opposing the amendment used
homophobic scare tactics to thwart its passage. Calling it the “Pro-Gay
E.R.A.,” conservatives argued that ERA legislation at the federal and state
levels would force states to endorse same-sex marriage.57 Instead of defend-
ing same-sex marriage—a reaction that may have drawn attention to the
substantial number of lesbians and bisexuals in the feminist movement—
feminist supporters of the ERA responded to the attack by insisting that the
ERA would not in fact lead to same-sex marriage.58 The conservative appeal
51 Although Stonewall is commonly referred to as the initiating event or event inspir-
ing the “birth” of gay liberation, historical research has demonstrated that Stonewall was
just one of several such national riots initiated by LGBT people during this time period.
See Elizabeth A. Armstrong & Suzanna M. Crage, Movements and Memory: The Making
of the Stonewall Myth, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 724, 724–25 (2006) (“The Stonewall riots did
not mark the origin of gay liberation. They were not the first time gays fought back
against police; nor was the raid at the Stonewall Inn the first to generate political organiz-
ing. Other events, however, failed to achieve the mythic stature of Stonewall and indeed
have been virtually forgotten.” (citations omitted)).
52 Id. at 736 (“As part of movement radicalization, activists adopted public protest as
a strategy. Beginning in the spring of 1965, East Coast Homophile Organizations
(ECHO) organized a series of ground-breaking public pickets.” (citations omitted)).
53 See id. at 743 (“[G]ay liberation was a precondition for the recognition of the
political potential of the situation at the Stonewall Inn. Without a radical political ap-
proach, activists would not have responded by escalating the conflict.”).
54 CAIN, supra note 48, at 158 (“In the early 1970s, a wave of lesbian and gay activ- R
ity commenced around the marriage issue.”).
55 Scott Barclay & Shauna Fisher, Cause Lawyers in the First Wave of Same-Sex
Marriage Litigation, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 84, 86 (Austin Sarat
& Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006).
56 The Equal Rights Amendment proposed in 1971–72 would have added to the Con-
stitution gender-specific language guaranteeing sex equality. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong.,
86 Stat. 1523 (1972) (“Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of sex.”).
57 See R. CLAIRE SNYDER, GAY MARRIAGE AND DEMOCRACY: EQUALITY FOR ALL
119 (2006).
58 See CAIN, supra note 48, at 257. It is possible that the feminists making these R
arguments were disdainful of marriage as an institution and thus deliberately chose not to
weigh in on the value of same-sex marriage. Regardless, the message that comes across
in their assuaging conservatives’ fears of same-sex marriage implicitly accepts the con-
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to homophobia is considered to have “played a role in the failure of the ERA
to win ratification of three-fourths of the state legislatures.”59
While the feminists carefully avoided the same-sex marriage discussion
in their ERA advocacy efforts, many gay liberationists confronted the issue
head on.60 The issue was not a universal priority among the diverse gay liber-
ationist groups.61 Some activists rejected marriage as a “rotten, oppressive
institution”62 and called for its abolition, scorning marriage equality advo-
cates for imitating heterosexual relationships.63 Others took a more romantic
view of the long-term commitment to a same-sex spouse as one more sign
on the road to complete liberation.64 Still others adopted a third path, which
saw same-sex marriage advocacy as a radical goal that advanced goals cen-
tral to gay liberation, such as embracing pride in homosexuality65 and pub-
licly contesting discriminatory institutions.66
It is in this context that LGB plaintiffs brought the first same-sex mar-
riage cases to court. These cases, brought in Minnesota,67 Kentucky,68 and
servative devaluation of LGB relationships. Cf. Clifford J. Rosky, Fear of the Queer
Child, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 607, 666–67 (2013) (mapping the fallacies of a progressive
empirical response to conservative “slippery slope” arguments, according to which ac-
knowledgment of LGBT relationships will lead to child abuse, as clinging to immutabil-
ity and as such failing to challenge the normative premise that children are better off
straight).
59 WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY
RIGHTS 8 (2002) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE].
60 Michael Boucai’s research suggests that gay liberationists focused on marriage for
reasons unrelated to the ERA. Boucai’s interviews with plaintiffs in the early 1970s mar-
riage cases suggest that these activists were generally seeking publicity and promoting
gay and lesbian pride; the activists did not cite ERA-related rhetoric as a motivation for
their marriage-related activism. See Boucai, supra note 38, at 150. R
61 Then again, the movement at the time was so decentralized that no issue likely
could be considered universal. MOIRA KENNEY, MAPPING GAY L.A.: THE INTERSECTION
OF PLACE AND POLITICS 83 (2001) (describing prominent gay liberation organization the
Gay Liberation Front as having a “hallmark decentralized street-based structure”).
62 MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH,
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 22 (2013) (“An early gay manifesto de-
nounced traditional marriage as a ‘rotten, oppressive institution’ that is ‘fraught with role
playing.’”).
63 CAIN, supra note 48, at 159 (one Seattle-based activist who prepared a position R
statement on marriage for the ACLU of Washington in 1970 “explain[ed] the discrimina-
tory effect of marriage on lesbians and gay men and call[ed] for the total abolition of
marriage”); LEE WALZER, GAY RIGHTS ON TRIAL: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 129–30
(2002).
64 CAIN, supra note 48, at 159. The fact that there were “thousands of couples who R
sought in the wake of Stonewall to solemnize their relationships in private ceremonies,”
Boucai, supra note 38, at 108, suggests that there were many LGB people at the time who R
were in this camp.
65 Boucai, supra note 38, at 162 (arguing that marriage advocacy was “fervently R
embraced by the gay liberation movement, that ‘gay is good’—even ‘to the degree of
being sacred’”).
66 Id. at 169 (marriage advocates of the 1970s sent the message that “there’s other
[LGB] people like you, and we’re fighting back”).
67 Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
68 Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
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Washington,69 raised three central constitutional arguments that have re-
mained essential in same-sex marriage litigation to this day:70 first, that
same-sex marriage prohibitions constituted sex-based discrimination (violat-
ing plaintiffs’ rights to equal protection); second, that same-sex marriage
prohibitions constituted sexual orientation discrimination and that sexual ori-
entation is a presumptively unconstitutional “suspect classification” (again
violating plaintiffs’ rights to equal protection); and third, that prohibiting
plaintiffs from marrying a same-sex partner denied a fundamental right (vio-
lating plaintiffs’ constitutional privacy interests).71
These early same-sex marriage cases were clearly a product of their
time in how they were pursued. The plaintiffs filed individually with private
attorneys, without being represented by a major LGBT legal organization.72
This was partly because only a handful of lesbian and gay public interest law
firms existed in the early 1970s when these cases were being litigated73—
and those law firms that did exist at the time limited their functions largely
to providing relief to LGB people whose rights had been violated.74 The fact
that the early marriage plaintiffs filed claims with private attorneys also re-
flects the decentralized politics of “gay liberation.” While most of the plain-
tiffs in those cases belonged to local gay liberationist groups,75 none of the
litigation was associated with those organizations or the larger movement
community.76
On one hand, these early marriage cases demonstrate a serious engage-
ment with the idea of legal protections for same-sex marriage. The attorneys
in these cases creatively deployed the most compelling legal arguments
69 Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
70 Boucai, supra note 38, at 149 (stating that the Baker, Jones, and Singer cases R
presented “[e]ach of the most prominent arguments in today’s gay marriage arsenal”).
71 Id. Each of these arguments is discussed in detail in Part III.
72 See generally id. (providing a detailed description of the three early-1970s mar-
riage cases).
73 CAIN, supra note 48, at 57 (“In the early 1970s, two public interest law firms were R
launched . . . Lambda Legal . . . [and] Equal Rights Advocates.”).
74 Id. at 59 (“At first, litigation efforts on behalf of gay men and lesbians were prima-
rily reactive, occurring in cases in which individuals were forced to defend the rights that
had been taken from them. Some time would pass before the lawyers for the movement
would become sufficiently organized to be proactive.”).
75 One of the plaintiffs in Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), belonged
to the University of Minnesota gay student group “FREE.” Boucai, supra note 38, at R
113. The plaintiffs in Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), belonged to
the Seattle Gay Alliance (SGA). Boucai, supra note 38, at 143–44. The plaintiffs in Jones R
v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973), belonged to the Gay Liberation Front (GLF).
Boucai, supra note 38, at 135. R
76 NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE 47–48 (2008) (dis-
cussing the Minnesota and Washington cases). The idea for the case came from “a repu-
tation-hunting criminal lawyer named Stuart Lyon, who had heard about the Minnesota
lawsuit and wanted a ‘controversial case’ of his own.” Boucai, supra note 38, at 132. R
Lyon located the plaintiffs through a mutual connection and they “up and went to the
marriage license bureau.” Id. at 132–33.
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available.77 Yet on the other hand, the plaintiffs in these cases had no genu-
ine expectation that they would succeed. In the early 1970s, the idea of
same-sex marriage was “unthinkable” to a degree that is difficult to concep-
tualize.78 Defeat was so certain that one of the Washington plaintiffs, in a
later interview, recalled his involvement in the case as a “political ploy.”79
The Eighth Circuit similarly referred to the Minnesota marriage suit as an
“antic.”80
Given the low prospects for success in these early marriage cases, why
did activists pursue those cases in the first place? Michael Boucai’s in-depth
examination of these cases has shown that a large motivation was to send a
political message—to promote goals such as fostering pride and gay visibil-
ity,81 which resonated with radical gay liberationist ideals.82 Accordingly, the
strategy reflects less of the standard emphasis on winning, which dominates
impact models of social change litigation today. Instead, the model that
drove the gay liberationist marriage equality cases was premised on cultural
gain rather than formal legal reform.83
Claiming a right to same-sex marriage in the early 1970s also evoked
such shock and revulsion from the heterosexual mainstream that the early
marriage cases resonated with the radical politics of gay liberation. These
cases were confrontational and disruptive, showing a clear refusal to remain
quietly closeted or to patiently wait for society to come around to accepting
gay men and lesbians. In addition, demanding marriage rights in a context
where plaintiffs could expect to be summarily dismissed sent more of a mes-
sage regarding the injustice of marriage than a commitment to entering the
institution. Indeed, framing marriage as an unjust institution resonated the
idea, expressed by one of the Singer plaintiffs, that he thought marriage was
“wrong” and “oppressive,” and that he “would just as soon abolish mar-
riage” as enter into it.84 Thus, although subsequent scholarly work has inter-
77 As an example of the attorneys’ creativity, all three of the attorneys in these cases
raised the claim that prohibitions on same-sex marriage violated the Eighth Amend-
ment—a claim that “today’s litigators would not dream of arguing.” Id. at 151.
78 Id. at 159.
79 Id. at 158.
80 CAIN, supra note 48, at 161. R
81 Boucai, supra note 38, at 125 (describing core liberationist principles: “[an] insis- R
tence on gay pride and the virtue of gay love; [a] deep commitment to feminism; [a]
heterogeneous critique of marriage and of the nuclear family; and [a] pursuit of visibility
through audacious and often theatrical disruption”).
82 The present Article seeks to build upon the counter-narrative that Boucai’s work
establishes to the traditional, dualist account that pits marriage equality advocacy against
gay liberation radicalism. For related work building on this topic, see Douglas NeJaime,
Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and Its Relation-
ship to Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 91–92 (2014) [hereinafter NeJaime, Before
Marriage].
83 Cf. Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 977 (2011)
(describing how one Christian Right organization litigates school-programming cases
with little chances of success because the cases enable cultural movement goals such as
creating visibility for core movement issues).
84 Boucai, supra note 38, at 107, 180. R
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preted these cases as representing a romantic, rosy-eyed view of marriage,85
it is more likely that the meaning that was derived from these cases at the
time—and, as Boucai’s work shows, the meaning that the plaintiffs them-
selves ascribed to the cases86—is that the early marriage plaintiffs were us-
ing litigation as a form of protest against unjust, discriminatory marriage
laws.87
Why were these early arguments demanding marriage equality so radi-
cal, such that they were “all but laughed out of court”?88 The historical con-
text of these cases is relevant in determining their meaning and interpretation
at the time they were pursued. It is not that marriage laws were impermeable
to politically motivated reform. Feminists and civil rights activists had been
challenging anti-miscegenation laws and marriage laws denying women
equal property rights for decades by this time, with several landmark suc-
cesses, showing that marriage was malleable enough to bend to political
pressure.89 The answer likely has more to do with the cultural framing of
homosexuality, which was mired in notions of shame and deviance, not
pride and public visibility.90 LGB people as a social group had just begun to
penetrate the public’s consciousness. The widespread media coverage of the
initial marriage lawsuits may have been the first time that the idea of gay
relationships entered many people’s scope of vision. Thus, despite the viabil-
85 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR
BETTER OR FOR WORSE?: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE 251 (2006) (argu-
ing that the plaintiffs in Minnesota’s early same-sex marriage case “hold [marriage] up
as a holy grail that lesbian and gay couples should strive to attain” and that “[t]hey want
the romanticism of traditional marriage to touch and transform the lives of gays in
America”).
86 See generally Boucai, supra note 38. R
87 Cf. Oneida Meranto, Litigation as Rebellion, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND AMERI-
CAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 216, 227 (A. Costain & A. McFarland eds., 1998) (discuss-
ing litigation as a form of protest in the context of Indian tribal rights); see also CAIN,
supra note 48, at 259 (quoting a Hawaii newspaper as stating that “25 gay couples are R
expected to file for marriage licenses to protest state ban on same-sex marriages”).
88 ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS AND INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL OP-
PORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION 206 (2008).
89 The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) began
challenging anti-miscegenation laws and policies as early as World War II. See Perez v.
Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 22–25 (Cal. 1948) (striking down a ban on interracial marriage);
Rachel F. Moran, Loving and the Legacy of Unintended Consequences, 2007 WIS. L.
REV. 239, 251 (2007). Feminists advocated to reform marriage statutes that treated wo-
men unequally to men with respect to property ownership and inheritance since the nine-
teenth century. See JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE 115
(2010). The Supreme Court dealt the feminist movement a series of victories in this area
starting in the early 1970s. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 202 (1977) (invalidat-
ing gender-based distinctions in survivors’ benefits in the Social Security Act); Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638–39 (1975) (same); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
74 (1971) (invalidating an Idaho statute giving preference to men when appointing ad-
ministrators of estates).
90 See Jordan Blair Woods, The Birth of Modern Criminology and Gendered Con-
structions of Homosexual Criminal Identity, 62 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 131, 132 (2015)
(“Prior to the 1970s, LGBTQ people in Western countries were commonly labeled as
criminals, psychopaths, sinners, and perverts.” (citation omitted)).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\38-2\HLG202.txt unknown Seq: 18  3-JUN-15 13:31
286 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 38
ity of same-sex marriage as a concept whose recognition under law would
not entail much of a doctrinal stretch, the cultural climate in which the early
marriage cases were raised infused those claims with a sense of radicalism.
B. Gay Rights Advocacy Puts Marriage on the Fringe
By the 1980s, LGBT activism had undergone major changes that left
the marriage issue in decline. As many commentators have noted, the domi-
nant political logic that defined LGBT activism shifted from the progressive
and radical strain of gay liberation politics to a “gay rights” model defined
by traditional civil rights strategies such as litigation and lobbying.91 In this
environment, the radical marriage activism of the seventies “languished in a
generational purgatory.”92
A standard explanation given for this lull in marriage equality activism
during the 1980s is that there was too much ideological opposition to mar-
riage coming from within the movement to legitimately prioritize the issue.93
Yet civil rights groups frequently pursue issues that are not universally sup-
ported by their constituencies.94 Plus, as the early marriage cases show, the
prospects for actually winning marriage rights at this time were so low that
demands for marriage equality were more meaningful for their radical mes-
saging effects—promoting gay visibility and protesting the discriminatory
effects of marriage—than for their ability to bring same-sex couples within
the institution’s fold.95
Increasing evidence suggests that the reason same-sex marriage advo-
cacy declined in the 1980s was not that gay and lesbian activists were too
radical for marriage, but rather that marriage was too radical for them.96 Les-
bian and gay activists faced an onslaught of negative developments, most
notably the onset of HIV/AIDS and the mobilization of a powerful antigay
countermovement, which set activists back significantly and put many of
91 Armstrong, supra note 47, at 161 (“Many scholars have remarked upon the trans- R
formation of gay liberation from a radical movement into one focused on identity build-
ing and gay rights.” (citations omitted)).
92 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 57 (1996). See also WALZER, supra note 63, at 132 R
(“The failure of these early cases, along with the ideology professed by some segments of
the gay and lesbian community, led to a long lull in the effort to win the right to marry.”).
93 NeJaime, Before Marriage, supra note 82, at 108. R
94 See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (examining
how civil rights attorneys’ decisions and priorities often departed from those of their
clients in school desegregation litigation); Leonore F. Carpenter, Getting Queer Priorities
Straight: How Direct Legal Services Can Democratize Issue Prioritization in the LGBT
Rights Movement, 17 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 108 (2014) (arguing that LGBT civil
rights organizations’ decision-making structures generate litigation priorities that clash
with the priorities of many in the LGBT community).
95 See supra Part I.A.
96 KLARMAN, supra note 62, at 22 (“This was a decade of incremental progress for R
gay rights, and gay marriage was a radical reform, not an incremental one.”).
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them on a cautious and defensive track.97 In this more conservative political
climate, the shock value of marriage (which had driven gay liberationists
toward the marriage issue) may have repelled the gay rights groups.98 In
addition, the organizational changes that accompanied the new LGB civil
rights approach discouraged activists from pursuing risky issues like mar-
riage. Unlike the small and fragmented set of gay liberationist organizations
of the 1970s, the lesbian and gay civil rights organizations of the 1980s were
large and bureaucratic, and they invested their significant share of the move-
ment resources into developing long-term national strategic agendas.99 With
this level of organizational weight being thrown into law reform strategies,
much more was at stake in the highly likely event of litigation loss in the
marriage equality context.
Interviews with lawyers involved in lesbian and gay rights litigation at
the time support the conclusion that caution and conservatism rather than
radical politics fueled litigators’ early decisions to avoid marriage cases.100 In
1989, attorneys from one of the largest lesbian and gay rights legal organiza-
tions of the day, the National Gay Rights Advocates (NGRA) (which dis-
banded in 1993), had strongly considered representing a gay couple in a
state-court challenge to Alaska’s prohibition on same-sex marriage.101 The
attorneys at NGRA, who considered their organization to be more on the
“cutting edge” than most of the lesbian and gay legal organizations of the
day,102 had even developed a litigation strategy103 and were ready to move
forward. However, when they presented the idea at a litigators’ roundtable (a
regular meeting of the nation’s LGBT legal organizations), the other attor-
neys in attendance expressed vehement opposition.104 The reasons for the
resistance had to do with the perceived inability of marriage litigation to
succeed in court at that time.105 As one NGRA attorney recalled:
97 Cf. TINA FETNER, HOW THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT SHAPED LESBIAN AND GAY ACTIV-
ISM 45 (2008).
98 See KLARMAN, supra note 62, at 22. R
99  FETNER, supra note 97, at 44. R
100 For the methodology used in these interviews, see Gwendolyn M. Leachman,
From Protest to Perry: How Litigation Shaped the LGBT Movement’s Agenda, 47 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1667, 1722 (2014).
101 Minutes, NGRA, Minutes of the NGRA Litigation Committee (Jan. 19, 1989)
(copy on file with second author).
102 Interview with Anonymous, NGRA, in L.A., Cal. (Sept. 17, 2012) (transcript on
file with second author).
103 Minutes, NGRA, supra note 101 (“This suit would be based on the right to pri- R
vacy and right to equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the Alaska Constitution.”);
Interview with Anonymous, NGRA, supra note 102 (“I remember we developed a [mar- R
riage] case in Alaska, sort of looking at the different courts, at which ones were more
likely to get a positive result down the road.”).
104 Interview with Anonymous, NGRA, supra note 102 (reporting other attorneys R
“wanting us to hold back on that” and “telling us not to move in that direction”).
105 Id. (saying that the other LGB legal organizations “thought it wasn’t the right
time” for marriage).
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I think that was one of the critiques about NGRA, that we would
do stuff like pushing marriage in Alaska . . . that you won’t get
anywhere with that. But it’s like, you’ll get there because you’re
advancing a social agenda. You know? The law is in service of
social change—that is the whole purpose of it.106
These comments suggest that the interviewed NGRA attorney had a
view of litigation that was much more in line with the “litigation as protest”
model of the 1970s. The flak that he and other NGRA attorneys received for
pursuing same-sex marriage can be attributed to the other gay rights attor-
neys’ “concern[s] about making bad caselaw.”107 Other individuals attempt-
ing to pursue same-sex marriage litigation by enlisting the help of private
attorneys faced similar blowback. The plaintiff in a Washington, D.C. mar-
riage lawsuit filed in 1991 reported receiving criticism from gay and lesbian
civil rights lawyers (whom one plaintiff called “self-appointed gay legal
czars”) fearful that the case would set bad precedent.108 These stories suggest
that caution, rather than radicalism, was the primary force driving the major
gay and lesbian civil rights organizations’ resistance to marriage litigation in
the late 1980s and early 1990s.109
Over time, increasing numbers of activists became frustrated with the
leading gay and lesbian civil rights groups’ incremental law-reform strategy.
A newly minted brand of activists, who called themselves “queer” (rather
than “gay and lesbian”), began to organize a new political agenda in out-
right opposition to the mainstream movement’s civil rights groups.110 Queer
groups modeled themselves on their radical predecessors in the gay libera-
tion movement. Their members used confrontational, creative direct action,
aimed at transforming the dominant sexual culture to affirmatively embrace
not only homosexuality, but other non-normative sexual practices and forms
of intimacy as well.111
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Craig R. Dean, Demanding Gay Marriage; One Gay Man’s Account of the Strug-
gle to Have his Union Recognized, 19 GAY COMMUNITY NEWS 7, 7 (1991).
109 This research, like previous work by Douglas NeJaime, calls into question the
accuracy of the typical scholarly narrative, which holds that LGBT movement attorneys
initially avoided marriage arguments for ideological reasons (e.g., rather than strategic
ones). Cf. NeJaime, Before Marriage, supra note 82, at 91 (“This Article challenges the R
assumptions that structure the ongoing scholarly debate over LGBT advocacy and mar-
riage. By revisiting the earlier era on which today’s critical assessments often rest, it
uncovers marriage’s centrality even before marriage became a formal part of the move-
ment’s agenda.”).
110 See Joshua Gamson, Must Identity Movements Self-Destruct? A Queer Dilemma,
42 SOC. PROBS. 390, 394 (1995) (describing queer politics as a “rejection of civil rights
strategies ‘in favor of . . . anti-assimilationist politics’” (quoting Arlene Stein & Ken
Plummer, “I Can’t Even Think Straight”: “Queer” Theory and the Missing Sexual
Revolution in Sociology, 12 SOC. THEORY 178, 182 (1994))).
111 Id. (stating that queer politics involve a “‘willingness to interrogate areas which
would not normally be seen as the terrain of sexuality’” (quoting Stein & Plummer, supra
note 110, at 182)). R
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The queer groups on the fringe of the lesbian and gay movement were
the first to revive same-sex marriage in an organized fashion. As early as
1989,112 queers around the country began staging “marry-in” demonstra-
tions,113 during which same-sex couples would solemnize marriage vows (al-
though oftentimes not so solemnly114) in public protest over their exclusion
from state marriage laws. One “marry-in” staged by the San Francisco chap-
ter of Queer Nation (one of the major protest groups to emerge in cities
across the United States in the late 1980s) provides a feel for the tenor of
these marriage protests. In 1990, queer protestors entered the city’s marriage
bureau in pairs and created a spectacle when the clerks refused to issue them
marriage licenses—kissing at the window, refusing to leave, even calling the
clerks “accomplices to murder.”115 They then engaged in a mass mock wed-
ding ceremony at city hall wearing campy “wedding drag” attire.116
As this depiction suggests, these queer “marry-ins” involved far more
revelry than reverence—suggesting that queers, like gay liberationists, were
fully prepared for their demands to fall on deaf ears. The purpose of these
protests, however, was not to actually get married; it was rather to send a
message about the injustice of discriminatory marriage laws and how those
laws stigmatized and subordinated LGB people. Indeed, even though the
queer marry-in participants were demanding marriage rights, the goal for at
least some of the protestors seems to have been to create a mockery of mar-
riage. Archival sources documenting these protests suggest that many, if not
most, of the members of the queer groups staging the protest were critical or
outright opposed to marriage.117 The Chicago Queer Nation chapter ac-
knowledged that many of its members “personally do not endorse the insti-
tution of marriage.”118 Queer Nation’s general pro-marriage position papers
referred to marriage as “an institution we all agree oppresses us”119 and de-
nounced the patriarchal roots of marriage.
112 Video footage of a 1989 ACT UP marriage protest in New York City is archived
at http://perma.cc/XGV8-2H93.
113 Memorandum, Queer Nation/Chicago Advocates Legal Rights For Same-Sex
Couples: Queer Nation Marry-In, Queer Nation (on file with second author).
114 See Pamphlet, You Are Cordially Invited to a Queer Wedding, Queer Nation
(Sept. 10, 1990) (on file with second author) (encouraging marry-in protestors at City
Hall to don “[s]igns, placards, and post-modern wedding drag”).
115 See Pamphlet, What to Do at a Queer “Marry-In,” Queer Nation (1990) (on file
with second author).
116 See Pamphlet, You Are Cordially Invited to a Queer Wedding, supra note 114. R
117 See Memorandum, Queer Nation/Chicago Advocates Legal Rights for Same Sex
Couples, supra note 113 (advertising a Queer Nation marry-in and stating that the group’s R
members “personally do not endorse the institution of marriage”); Pamphlet, What to do
at a Queer “Marry-In,” supra note 115; Open Letter, John Mayflower, Legalized Same- R
Sex Marriage, Queer Nation (Jan. 23, 1991) (copy on file with second author) (stating
that “[t]he question most vocally raised today about marriage is the notion that it is
patriarchal i.e., an institution created by man to capture and enslave women”).
118 Memorandum, Queer Nation/Chicago Advocates Legal Rights for Same Sex
Couples, supra note 113. R
119 Pamphlet, What to do at a Queer “Marry-In,” supra note 115. R
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Remarkably absent from the queer groups’ writings on marriage was the
sense that members were particularly torn about their organization’s focus on
marriage. Instead, the documents these groups produced suggest that mem-
bers did not see demanding marriage rights as discordant with opposing mar-
riage. For example, one flyer denounced marriage and encouraged members
to participate in demanding marriage rights in the same breath: “Those who
have problems with marriage in general can still express their outrage at an
institution which we all agree oppresses us, whether by omission or commis-
sion. What a better place to hold a kiss-in and demand that the privileges
associated with marriage be extended to everyone.”120 This passage again
suggests that demanding marriage was aimed less at endorsing marriage and
more at expressing queers’ “outrage” at marriage and shocking the public.
The queer marriage protest strategy exemplifies how the legal and cul-
tural context of marriage-related political action can thoroughly transform
the meaning and interpretation of that action. Early marriage advocacy was
able to send a marriage-destabilizing message precisely because the idea of
same-sex marriage held no legal or cultural resonance at the time. The inac-
cessibility of marriage—the fact that LGB couples’ demands for marriage
would unquestionably be summarily denied—is what enabled both the early
gay liberation activists and later queer activists to construct a radical same-
sex marriage campaign, using litigation to send a message of marriage’s in-
stitutional illegitimacy.
C. Marriage Equality Enters the Mainstream
While many in the mainstream LGBT civil rights groups of the late
1980s and early 1990s actively discouraged same-sex marriage litigation,121
some “rogue” marriage cases represented by private attorneys arose at this
time nonetheless.122 This section turns to examining how a victory in one of
those same-sex marriage cases—a victory made possible in part by the
mainstream groups’ efforts to secure nonmarital recognition of marriage-like
relationships between same-sex couples—transformed marriage equality
from a radical concept to a tangible movement goal. Once marriage was
within reach, mainstream LGBT organizations shifted focus, coming to pri-
oritize the pursuit of same-sex marriage rights that has remained a central
priority to this day.
120 Id.
121 See ANDERSEN, supra note 88, at 177. R
122 For example, in March of 1990, gay couples in Honolulu began preparations for
marriage equality litigation. Robert W. Peterson, Gay Marriage Query Becomes a Sticky
Issue for Hawaii ACLU Chapter, ADVOCATE, Sept. 25, 1990, at 27. In late 1990, a gay
couple filed another marriage case in Washington D.C. Patrice Gaines-Carter, Legal Snag
Keeps Gays from Tying the Knot: Couple Denied Marriage License Sues D.C., WASH.
POST, Dec. 6, 1990, at C5.
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Although explicit advocacy for same-sex marriage remained taboo
among mainstream gay and lesbian civil rights groups in the early 1990s,
attaining legal recognition of and benefits for same-sex relationships was a
central priority.123 The U.S. Supreme Court decision Bowers v. Hardwick,124
which upheld the constitutionality of state laws criminalizing sexual inti-
macy between gay adults,125 derailed much of these organizations’ impact
litigation strategies in the federal courts,126 prompting large-scale shifts in
legal strategy.127 Among these shifts was the decision to prioritize the issue
of relationship recognition.128 Gay and lesbian civil rights groups sought le-
gal recognition for LGB couples in areas from family law, to insurance ben-
efits, to employment discrimination. A main priority targeted by the
National Center for Lesbian Rights (formerly Lesbian Rights Project), for
example, was custody and visitation rights for lesbian mothers who were
denied access to their children after being separated from the children’s bio-
logical mothers.129 Another priority was securing insurance benefits for
same-sex partners.130 NGRA pursued cases in which partners were essen-
tially living like married couples but were refused insurance benefits such as
discounts granted to married people, access to joint “umbrella” liability pol-
icies (saving them nearly half the cost of separate policies), or access to
employer-provided health insurance benefits for the same-sex partners of
insured LGB employees.131
While the lesbian and gay rights organizations that pursued these
nonmarital relationship recognition cases may have considered those cases a
“safe” alternative to marriage litigation, their efforts—in the court of public
opinion at least—tended to be construed as advancing the cause of same-sex
123 See ANDERSEN, supra note 88, at 39; CAIN, supra note 48, at 169–72. R
124 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
125 Id. at 196.
126 Joseph Landau, Ripple Effect, NEW REPUBLIC (June 23, 2003), http://www.newre
public.com/article/ripple-effect, archived at http://perma.cc/R6A8-YHUS.
127 Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 7, at 1249. R
128 Unpublished Panel Notes, Anne Goldstein, Nan D. Hunter & Jay M. Kohorn,
Where After Hardwick?, Lavender Law (Nov. 12, 1988) (on file with second author)
(discussing the need to “refocus on the family” after Bowers v. Hardwick).
129 Lesbian Rights Project, Fact Sheet (“Founded in 1977, the Lesbian Rights Project
began by specializing in custody and related family issues. Since then, LRP has coun-
seled thousands of lesbian mothers and gay fathers through their legal struggles to main-
tain and regain custody of their children.”) (on file with second author).
130 See FREDERICK HERTZ & EMILY DOSKOW, MAKING IT LEGAL: A GUIDE TO SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE, DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS & CIVIL UNIONS 10–11 (2009) (discussing the
campaign to obtain insurance benefits for same-sex couples in San Francisco in the
1980s).
131 See, e.g., Gay Couples Charged Double for House Insurance, NGRA NEWSLET-
TER (Nat’l Gay Rights Advocates), Winter 1988–1989, at 2 (on file with second author)
(“Boyce Hinman and Larry Beaty have lived together as family partners for 14 years in
Sacramento. They own a home together, have a joint bank account, and are each other’s
primary beneficiaries in their wills and life insurance policies. When they applied for
additional home liability coverage, with Farmers Insurance Company, they were told
their premium would be $260—instead of the $130 they would be charged if they were
married.”).
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marriage.132 As work by Douglas NeJaime has shown, even as LGBT liti-
gators pursued alternatives to marriage, they often used marriage as a key
reference point.133 Attorneys would often talk about their nonmarital cases in
marriage-like terms, stressing things like emotional and economic interde-
pendence, mutual support, intimacy, and length of time together.134 In
NeJaime’s case study of domestic partnership work in California in the 1980s
and 1990s, NeJaime shows that:
[T]o achieve nonmarital recognition, advocates appealed to mar-
riage’s conventions, pointed to the unique exclusion of same-sex
couples from marriage, and stressed same-sex couples’ commonal-
ity with married couples. In building domestic partnership, they
emphasized marital norms—such as adult romantic affiliation,
mutual emotional commitment, and economic interdependence—
capable of including same-sex couples. By challenging marriage’s
primacy while arguing for recognition in terms defined by marital
norms, advocates contested, accepted, and ultimately shaped the
institution of marriage while simultaneously portraying same-sex
relationships as marriage-like.135
Newspaper articles covering nonmarital relationship recognition cases
also framed those cases as relating to marriage, noting how LGB people
needed to compensate for the fact that the “law does not recognize any form
of gay marriage.”136 For example, one 1990 article in the New York Times
covering the increasing number of custody cases involving LGB parents de-
scribed the origins of the phenomenon as follows:
As homosexual men and women become more public, and an
increasing number of lesbian couples choose to rear children, they
are taking their private problems to court. Increasingly, judges face
the daunting task of handling what amount to divorces involving
people who cannot legally marry. They must address contracts dis-
putes, the division of property and businesses, and support
payments.137
Perhaps taking its cue from the attorneys in the case, the Times article re-
flects a dominant tendency in the mainstream media to frame nonmarital
relationship recognition cases as being necessitated by out-of-date marriage
132 NeJaime, Before Marriage, supra note 82, at 161 (“Both supportive and hostile
responses filtered LGBT claims through the lens of marriage, and such responses often
redirected advocates’ energy and constrained potentially more transformative visions.”).
133 Id. at 113.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Anne Stroock, Gay “Divorces” Complicated by Lack of Laws, S.F. CHRON., May
14, 1990, at A4.
137 David Margolick, Child Custody Cases Test Frontiers of Family Law, N.Y. TIMES,
July 4, 1990, at 1.
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laws that arbitrarily excluded otherwise marriage-like same-sex relation-
ships. Whatever the “true” motivations that gay and lesbian civil rights at-
torneys might have intended in pursuing these cases, the interpretation
promoted by the press was that the problem was the narrowness of mar-
riage—suggesting that marriage should be extended (not abolished).138 Thus,
while lesbian and gay litigation groups may have pursued nonmarital rela-
tionship recognition to avoid creating too much of a splash, their efforts in
this area ultimately worked in tandem with the more radical, explicit mar-
riage activism by queer protest groups (and the gay liberationists before
them) to awaken the heterosexual public’s consciousness to the idea of same-
sex marriage.139
It was in this setting—following years of nonmarital relationship recog-
nition advocacy and radical same-sex marriage “protests” in the courts and
streets—that same-sex couples received their first courtroom victory for
marriage equality.140 In 1991, gay couples in Hawaii (represented by private
counsel141) challenged on state constitutional grounds the state’s refusal to
grant them a marriage license.142 While a circuit court initially dismissed
these plaintiffs’ complaint for failing to state a cognizable claim,143 the Ha-
waii Supreme Court later vacated the circuit court’s decision, holding that
denying same-sex couples the right to marry violated the state constitution’s
equal protection clause.144 The Hawaii Supreme Court rejected as “circular”
the state’s argument—an argument that had been readily accepted by previ-
ous state courts in Minnesota and Washington145—that the traditional, dic-
138 Without ascribing a specific motivation to the attorneys pursuing the nonmarital
relationship recognition efforts, there is evidence to suggest that marriage did in fact
figure strongly in the LGB attorneys’ framing of these cases. See generally NeJaime,
Before Marriage, supra note 82 (examining how advocates for nonmarital relationship R
recognition framed their claims in marriage-like terms).
139 Cf. Barclay & Fisher, supra note 55, at 90–91 (arguing that the early marriage R
cases signaled to the public that the “sexual configuration associated with marriage was
now contested and that the imposed sexual hegemony was no longer simply accepted as
natural”).
140 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59–63 (Haw. 1993), superseded by constitutional
amendment, HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (holding that a Hawaii statute that expressly dis-
criminates against same-sex marriage constitutes sex discrimination under the Hawaii
Constitution and is subject to strict scrutiny).
141 The couples were represented by ex-ACLU attorney Dan Foley. ANDERSEN, supra
note 88, at 178. “Foley approached both Lambda and the ACLU for assistance in the R
case, but they both declined the invitation to become cocounsel [sic].” Id.
142 Baehr, 852 P.2d at 48–49.
143 Id. at 52.
144 See id. at 59–60 (noting that the Hawaii Constitution is “more elaborate” than the
Federal Constitution and that “by its plain language, the Hawaii Constitution prohibits
state-sanctioned discrimination against any person in the exercise of his or her civil rights
on the basis of sex”).
145 Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187
(Wash. Ct. App. 1974). These earlier decisions upheld state prohibitions on same-sex
marriage through little more than a recital of the dictionary definition of marriage as a
union between two opposite-sex individuals.
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tionary definition of marriage as between individuals of the opposite sex
forbade same-sex couples from marrying.146
The Baehr decision became the focus of massive public attention.147 In
the years since the same-sex marriage cases of the early 1970s, LGBT peo-
ple had become much more publicly visible. The HIV/AIDS epidemic put
gay men on the nightly news and made LGB people the topic of political
discussion and public commentary,148 priming public interest in same-sex
marriage. The “in your face” approach of queer activism in the early 1990s
also demanded public attention. While the increasing visibility of LGB peo-
ple may have been disconcerting for many straight people and alarming for
social conservatives, little concerted antigay organizing took place until after
Baehr.149 Conservatives framed the impact of the Hawaii decision broadly,
noting that states across the nation would have to recognize same-sex mar-
riages.150 The decision stirred such virulent political opposition that fifteen
states passed ballot initiatives the next election cycle limiting marriage to
heterosexual couples and Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act ena-
bling states to ignore same-sex marriages from other states.151
In addition to provoking backlash among conservatives, Baehr is often
credited with triggering widespread changes in mainstream LGBT activism.
Previous empirical work suggests that Baehr motivated the major gay and
lesbian civil rights groups to begin prioritizing same-sex marriage.152 The
initial Baehr decision in 1993 motivated one of the largest national LGBT
rights organizations, Lambda Legal, to intervene as co-counsel for appeals in
the case.153 Lambda later established a Marriage Project that aimed to “coor-
dinate and facilitate state-by-state political organizing and public education
around the issue of same-sex marriage.”154 Since then, all of the major
146 Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60–63.
147 CAIN, supra note 48, at 259 (discussing how the Hawaii litigation “became the R
focus of the entire nation.”).
148 See Kevin Williams, Dying of Ignorance? Journalists, News Sources and the Me-
dia Reporting of HIV/AIDS, in SOCIAL POLICY, THE MEDIA AND MISREPRESENTATION 69,
69 (Bob Franklin ed., 2d ed. 2002).
149 GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 362 (2d ed. 2008).
150 See id.
151 Michael C. Dorf & Sidney Tarrow, Strange Bedfellows: How an Anticipatory
Countermovement Brought Same-Sex Marriage into the Public Arena, 39 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 449, 455 (2014).
152 ANDERSEN, supra note 88, at 177–78 (“[U]ntil 1993, none of the major gay legal R
groups treated same-sex marriage as an immediate priority. That all changed when the
Hawaii Supreme Court handed down its groundbreaking decision in Baehr v. Lewin.”).
153 Id. at 179 (“The 1993 decision in Baehr . . . served as the impetus for widespread
gay rights mobilization around same-sex marriage rights. Preeminent among the newly
mobilized in this area was Lambda. After the decision came down, Lambda reversed its
earlier stance of nonaction with respect to same-sex marriage. Part of the reason for this
reversal may have been staff turnover . . . . Interviews with present and former staff
members, though, indicate that the legal opening provided by Baehr was the primary
stimulus for Lambda’s change of heart.”).
154 Id.
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LGBT legal groups have taken cases and created projects devoted to same-
sex marriage.155 This legal mobilization led to a series of highly visible suc-
cesses throughout the 2000s, with state high courts in Massachusetts,156 Cali-
fornia,157 Connecticut,158 and Iowa159 finding the right of same-sex couples to
marry in their states’ constitutions. LGBT rights groups initially sought to
avoid the federal courts, which they perceived as a hostile and risky venue
for marriage equality claims.160 However, private attorneys opened the flood-
gates to the federal courts in 2012 with the U.S. Supreme Court cases Hol-
lingsworth v. Perry161 and United States v. Windsor.162 Although these
decisions did not directly rule on the validity of same-sex marriage bans, the
Court’s sweeping language provided significant traction for arguments that
such bans violated the U.S. Constitution.163 After those decisions, LGBT
movement organizations and private attorneys alike have brought dozens of
cases challenging marriage bans in both state and federal court.164
* * *
This section has traced the development of same-sex marriage from its
original position as a radical, fringe issue to its current position at the heart
of LGBT activism. Expanding on recent work,165 this account further
problematizes the standard historical account of same-sex marriage activism,
which draws a bright line between “assimilationist” marriage advocacy ef-
forts and “radical” queer and liberationist politics. Instead, our analysis sup-
ports the emerging view of marriage equality as a political issue that can
155 Id. at 184–85 (describing how “[m]uch had changed” in discussions among the
major gay rights litigation organizations within six years of Baehr: “The major groups all
agreed that the time was right to push the legal envelope still further” on same-sex
marriage).
156 Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
157 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
158 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
159 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
160 See ANDERSEN, supra note 88, at 227. R
161 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013).
162 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). In addition to private attorneys, the Windsor case
was led by co-counsel at the American Civil Liberties Union and New York Civil Liber-
ties Union. Complaint, Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(No. 10-CV-8435).
163 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (“DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset
of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal. The principal purpose is to impose
inequality, not for other reasons like governmental efficiency. Responsibilities, as well as
rights, enhance the dignity and integrity of the person. And DOMA contrives to deprive
some couples married under the laws of their State, but not other couples, of both rights
and responsibilities . . . . This places same-sex couples in an unstable position of being in
a second-tier marriage. The differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual
choices the Constitution protects.”)
164 See Marriage Litigation, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/
litigation, archived at http://perma.cc/N5PW-6YEP.
165 See Boucai, supra note 38; NeJaime, Before Marriage, supra note 82. R
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assume new and quite different meanings depending on the historical and
cultural context in which it is advocated.
This historical account of the shifting meaning and politics of same-sex
marriage illustrates several points that are relevant to poly marriage activism
today. First, it shows that mobilization around state relationship recognition
can take various forms—each of which offers a distinct model of legal mo-
bilization that poly activists may choose to implement. One form of mar-
riage mobilization sees demanding marriage equality as a radical form of
politics. Like many poly activists today, lesbian and gay activists have his-
torically been mindful of the problematic nature of marriage as a patriarchal
institution that involves the state in privileging certain forms of intimacy
over others.166 Yet as this Part shows, it is possible for activists to construct
alternative, radical models of marriage litigation if they are so inspired. Pre-
Baehr marriage equality activists, facing certain defeat in court, pursued
marriage litigation in part to expose and protest the injustice marriage pro-
duces—a radical message aimed to destabilize marriage as an institution. By
contrast, the more recent models of gay and lesbian litigation—the
nonmarital relationship recognition campaign and the post-Baehr campaign
for marriage equality—exemplify the more careful, incremental approach
that impact litigation groups are known for taking.
Second, this Part has given several examples of how the legal and cul-
tural climate in which a movement operates (along with the shared norms
among activists within a given movement) can fundamentally shape the
types of strategies those actors will pursue. In the gay liberation years, the
lack of legal or cultural resonance around same-sex marriage created the
possibility for a marriage equality campaign that promoted transgression and
furthered radical ideals. Once the legal doctrine and cultural ideas about ho-
mosexuality had shifted enough that marriage rights were actually within
LGB people’s reach, the meaning of demanding marriage became equivalent
to the desire to access a prominent social institution—not to destroy it.167
Thus, the increasing legal acceptance and cultural acclimatization toward
same-sex relationships reconstituted the meaning of marriage equality litiga-
tion, such that the more assimilationist LGBT movement groups that eventu-
ally became the movement’s mainstream organizations could come to accept
the strategy as a central one on their agenda.
166 The Loving More survey revealed ambivalence about marriage among a majority
of respondents. See What Do Polys Want?, supra note 30 (reporting that 66.9% of respon- R
dents thought that no relationship structure “deserve[d] special recognition”). See also
infra Part I (discussing similar ambivalence in the pre-1993 LGBT movement).
167 For this reason, the pursuit of marriage rights in the abstract cannot be considered
an inherently assimilationist or radical goal.
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II. THE POLYAMOROUS COMMUNITY AND ITS (MULTIPLE)
VIEWS ON MARRIAGE
The radical roots of LGBT marriage activism, and the comparison to
the radical notion of multiparty marriage today, may suggest that the poly-
amorous community currently occupies the same political, cultural, and legal
space that gay liberationists occupied in the 1970s. However, that would be
a simplistic, ahistorical notion that ignores the fact that poly activism today
operates in spaces and against constraints formed, in part, by the struggles,
successes, and failures of the LGBT community, and therefore in a more
nuanced and complicated legal, political, and cultural terrain than that which
surrounded gay liberationists in the early days of “marry-ins” and radical
protest. In order to understand the complex relationships between the two
movements, we proceed to provide background on the polyamorous commu-
nity, its activists and advocates, and the way in which members of the com-
munity relate to the marriage equality struggle.
A. Polyamory: Definition, Nomenclature, Demographics
Polyamory, a portmanteau of Greek and Roman words,168 is a term
coined in 1990 by Morning Glory Zell-Ravenheart, a well-known public fig-
ure in the Pagan and polyamorous communities, to describe “the custom or
practice of engaging in multiple sexual [or, for some, romantic] relation-
ships with the knowledge and consent of all partners concerned.”169 Before
the 1990s, it was common to refer to similar lifestyles and practices as “re-
168 Interestingly, “homosexuality” is also a blend of Greek and Roman words, caus-
ing some disfavor for the term in its early adoption. Siobhan Somerville, Scientific Ra-
cism and the Invention of the Homosexual Body, in QUEER STUDIES: A LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER ANTHOLOGY 241, 249–50 (Brett Beemyn & Mickey Eliason
eds., 1996).
169 Robyn Trask & Alan M., What is Polyamory?, LOVING MORE, http://www.love
more.com/home/what-is-polyamory/, archived at http://perma.cc/55HN-2MSZ; see also
Maura I. Strassberg, The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy: Considering Polyamory,
31 CAP. U. L. REV. 439, 439–40 (2003). For some relationship activists who are “poly-
friendly,” however, an important aspect of polyamory is its contribution to the apprecia-
tion of nonsexual love as equally important and meaningful. See WENDY-O MATIK,
REDEFINING OUR RELATIONSHIPS: GUIDELINES FOR RESPONSIBLE OPEN RELATIONSHIPS
(2002) (discussing nonsexual, as well as sexual, concept of multiple loves: “An open
relationship cannot be reduced to the act of sex alone. There are more than a thousand
ways to make love, to recreate intimacy in your every day life, to suck the juices from a
piece of fruit and feel full for the first time. Being in an open relationship means you have
the revolutionary opportunity to have guilt-free sex with life, with yourself, with your
soul. Expand your notions of eroticism, rediscover verbal and written affection, invent a
new way to hug that truly expresses how much you feel for that person, massage every
inch of your lover’s body without making sex the goal.”); Valerie White, Polyamory and
the Law, LOVING MORE, Winter 2002, at 7, 7–10 (discussing legal consequences of
polyamory).
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sponsible nonmonogamy.”170 Many polyamorous people stress the distinc-
tion between polyamory and swinging,171 which some define as involving
sexual exchanges between couples rather than full relationships of more ver-
satile patterns.172 It is frequently argued that polyamory is the opposite of
“cheating”;173 whereas cheating is defined by frequent174 and discreet sexual
infidelities in ostensibly monogamous couples, the practice of polyamory is
built on a foundation of honesty and consent.
There are various types and structures of polyamorous relationships,175
and the community members’ fierce individualism often stands in the way of
providing one way of “how to do polyamory right.”176 Many polyamorous
relationships consist of a “primary” dyad, a couple sharing a household, in
which each partner also has “secondary” and “tertiary” relationships with
outsiders to the household.177 While this arrangement is fairly common,178
and the “primary/secondary” terminology is in wide use,179 many poly-
amorous people tend to regard the structure as overly confining, arguing
instead that all their relationships, though different in nature, involve love
and commitment.180 Other common structures are the “polyamorous vee,” in
which two people have romantic relationships with the same person, but not
170 See DEBORAH M. ANAPOL, POLYAMORY: THE NEW LOVE WITHOUT LIMITS:
SECRETS OF SUSTAINABLE INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 5 (1997) [hereinafter ANAPOL,
POLYAMORY: THE NEW LOVE WITHOUT LIMITS] (“The term polyamory was first pro-
posed by Church of All Worlds founders Oberon and Morning Glory Zell to replace the
awkward expression responsible nonmonogamy.”); Marcia Munson & Judith P.
Stelboum, Introduction to THE LESBIAN POLYAMORY READER: OPEN RELATIONSHIPS,
NON-MONOGAMY, AND CASUAL SEX 1, 1 (Marcia Munson & Judith P. Stelboum eds.,
1999) (“In the 1980s, the term ‘non-monogamy’ was used to describe multiple concurrent
sexual involvements.”).
171 Serolynne, Compare and Contrast: Polyamory vs. Swinging, SEROLYNNE, http://
www.serolynne.com/polyvsswing.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/LZ6C-7VAX.
172 CHRISTINA RICHARDS & MEG BARKE, SEXUALITY AND GENDER FOR MENTAL
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 209 (2013).
173 For an explanation of the honesty, disclosure, and communication paradigm be-
yond poly relationships, listen to Beyond Monogamy (KQED radio broadcast Feb. 13,
2015), http://www.kqed.org/a/forum/R201502131000, archived at http://perma.cc/L2CX-
9ZPS.
174 Multiple studies of heterosexual fidelity have found that around one-third of men
and one-quarter of women report at least one instance of sexual infidelity during a mo-
nogamous relationship. See Kristen P. Mark, Erick Janssen & Robin R. Milhausen, Infi-
delity in Heterosexual Couples: Demographic, Interpersonal, and Personality-Related
Predictors of Extradyadic Sex, 40 ARCHIVE SEXUAL BEHAV. 971, 971 (2011).
175 ANAPOL, POLYAMORY: THE NEW LOVE WITHOUT LIMITS, supra note 170, at 9. R
176 Aviram, Make Love, Not Law, supra note 26, at 281 (discussing a common sense R
among polyamorous respondents that it was inappropriate to enforce a “correct” way of
living in polyamorous relationships).
177 See ANAPOL, POLYAMORY: THE NEW LOVE WITHOUT LIMITS, supra note 170, at 9; R
RICHARDS & BARKE, supra note 172, at 209–10. R
178 Aviram, Make Love, Not Law, supra note 26, at 269. R
179 See TRISTAN TAORMINO, OPENING UP: A GUIDE TO CREATING AND SUSTAINING
OPEN RELATIONSHIPS 74–77 (2008) (explaining the usefulness of hierarchical poly mod-
els for some relationships).
180 See Serena Anderlini-D’Onofrio, Polyamory, in SEXUALITY: THE ESSENTIAL GLOS-
SARY 164, 164–65 (Jo Eadie ed., 2004).
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with each other (though they may share a nonromantic sense of affection and
commitment); a triad or a quad, in which all three or four members are
romantically involved with each other; or an intimate network of friends, in
which relationships are more fluid and involve several people in different
and ever-changing relationship structures.181 All these structures may, or
may not, involve “polyfidelity”—a commitment to have sexual or romantic
relationships only with members of the group.182 Growing concerns about
sexually-transmitted diseases have popularized careful protocols, such as ad-
herence to clear disclosures regarding number of partners and a general atti-
tude of caution regarding “fluid bonding” (sexual intercourse without
barrier methods).183
The versatility in genders, sexual orientations, and sexual identities dis-
tinguishes the polyamorous community from other groups that practice
nonmonogamy as part of a religious or ethnic tradition, and activists fre-
quently identify the differences.184 The Loving More survey revealed a high
percentage of people involved in relationships with partners of both sexes
(46.3% for women, 18.8% for men).185 The high percentage of same-sex
relationships in the poly community suggests that there may be some amount
of overlap in poly and LGBT communities and may help explain why many
poly activists have expressed support for the LGBT movement’s marriage
equality campaign.186
181 See ANAPOL, POLYAMORY: THE NEW LOVE WITHOUT LIMITS, supra note 170, at R
7–9; ROBERT MCGAREY, POLY COMMUNICATION SURVIVAL KIT: THE ESSENTIAL TOOLS
FOR BUILDING AND ENHANCING RELATIONSHIPS 5 (1999).
182 See ANAPOL, POLYAMORY: THE NEW LOVE WITHOUT LIMITS, supra note 170, at 9. R
Polyfidelity was more common in the early days of the movement, such as in the Kerista
collective. See Ayala Pines & Elliot Aronson, Polyfidelity: An Alternative Lifestyle with-
out Jealousy?, 4 ALTERNATIVE LIFESTYLES 373, 373–74 (1981).
183 See RICHARDS & BARKE, supra note 172, at 210–11. For a critique of “fluid bond- R
ing” as a strategy for preventing sexually-transmitted diseases, see Jenny Ford, What
They Don’t Tell You about STDs and Non-Monogamy, THE POLYAMOROUS MISANTHROPE
(2007), http://www.polyamorousmisanthrope.com/2007/07/29/what-they-dont-tell-you-
about-stds-and-non-monogamy/, archived at http://perma.cc/RHQ2-HZ2D (arguing that
the need to confirm the health status of multiple partners can be unsustainable even when
some of the participants are “fluid-bonded” and some are not).
184 See Aviram, Make Love, Not Law, supra note 26, at 274. R
185 What Do Polys Want?, supra note 30. R
186 See infra Part II.C (discussing perceptions of the marriage equality struggle
among polyamorous people). In addition, the polyamorous population was significantly
more educated than the general U.S. population: 35% of respondents had a bachelor’s
degree and 27.4% had a graduate degree, compared with 17.9% and 10.4% respectively
in the general population. What Do Polys Want?, supra note 30. Household composition R
also varied, but included, on average, more adults and fewer children than in the general
population. Id. The survey also found polyamorous respondents to be happier, in better
health, and experiencing more sex with more partners than the general population. Id.
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B. A Brief History of the Polyamorous Community
The practice of the set of lifestyles referred to since 1990 as “poly-
amory” can be traced to the 1960s movements of free love and sexual free-
dom.187 It was during this era that nonmonogamy became much more
culturally prevalent, with the popularization of swinging (a practice closely
associated with polyamory until the 1980s)188 and the diffusion of sexual
liberation organizations, communes, and magazines.189 While in the early
1960s there were hardly any cultural role models or resources for people
seeking nonmonogamy, the mid-1960s offered more such resources, such as
Jefferson Airplane’s song Triad190 and Robert Heinlein’s influential science
fiction novel Stranger in a Strange Land.191 Heinlein’s book, which is still
regarded by many poly activists as the catalyst for their lifestyles,192 tells the
story of a man raised on Mars who returns to Earth and teaches a group of
humans about Martian culture, including a life in “nests”—intimate network
units of men and women who reside together and share love in a non-posses-
sive fashion.193 The book found a particularly enthusiastic readership among
members of the Pagan community, which, inspired by its plot, founded a
real-life spiritual organization, the Church of All Worlds (CAW) that pro-
vided the framework for a life in familial “nests,” as well as published an
alternative magazine, Green Egg, which ran from 1968 to 2001.194 At the
time, other communes—not necessarily affiliated with Paganism or Earth-
based spirituality—came into existence. The Kerista collective, which ex-
isted in the 1970s in San Francisco, ran a successful computer dealership,
and was composed of families with thirty-six members each.195 The collec-
tive relied on a model of polyfidelity (fidelity within each family) and on a
rotational sleeping schedule between its members.196
187 See Maura Irene Strassberg, Distinguishing Polygamy and Polyamory Under the
Criminal Law, in FAMILIES—BEYOND THE NUCLEAR IDEAL 160, 166 (Daniela Cutas &
Sarah Chan eds., 2012).
188 See Pepper Mint, “Border Wars: Swinging and Polyamory” at Building Bridges
IV, (Oct. 16, 2004) (unpublished paper), http://pepperminty.com/writing/swingingand
polyamory.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NCZ7-49X3.
189 Panel, Margo Rila, Maggi Rubenstein & Jerry Zientara, Scenes from the Late 60’s
Sexual Culture in the Bay Area, Society for the Scientific Study of Sexuality Annual
Meeting: Unstudied, Understudied and Underserved Sexual Communities (May 6, 2005)
(conference program on file with first author).
190 JEFFERSON AIRPLANE, TRIAD (RCA Victor 1968).
191 ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, STRANGER IN A STRANGE LAND (1961).
192 DEBORAH ANAPOL, POLYAMORY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: LOVE AND INTI-
MACY WITH MULTIPLE PARTNERS 50–51 (2010).
193 HEINLEIN, supra note 191. See also LEWIS CALL, BDSM IN AMERICAN SCIENCE R
FICTION AND FANTASY 20 (2012).
194 See About Green Egg, GREEN EGG: LEGENDARY JOURNAL OF THE AWAKENING
EARTH, http://www.greeneggzine.com/about_green_egg_23.html, archived at http://per
ma.cc/56LT-BS92.
195 Suzann Robins, Remembering the Kiss . . . , 4 J. BISEXUALITY 99, 102 (2004).
196 ANAPOL, POLYAMORY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 192, at 57. R
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While some polyamorous relationships adhere to a polyfidelity model
like that used in the Kerista collective, there is a deep resistance within the
polyamorous community to such compulsory limitations on sexual partner-
ing outside of established relationships.197 Indeed, such regulations on
partnering are a key component of monogamy, the sexually regulatory insti-
tution that polyamorists collectively resist.198 This resistance to monog-
amy—the core value that unites the individuals in quite diverse polyamorous
relationship structures—resonates strongly with not only a sexual-liberation-
ist philosophy, but also with feminist and queer political philosophies. The
feminist critique of monogamy highlights how norms against infidelity are
more binding on women than men and are historically rooted in a proprie-
tary view of women.199 Several polyamorous commentators cite such femi-
nist understandings of monogamy and women’s sexual control as a driving
force in their decisions to pursue polyamory,200 creating a visible sex-posi-
tive feminist presence in the polyamorous community.201
In addition to feminism, queer politics has also deeply influenced poly-
amory. As noted above, queer politics emerged in the 1980s as a fiery new
brand of confrontational sexuality-based activism.202 Queer politics emerged
in response to both the virulent stigmatization of deviant sexualities in the
wake of the AIDS epidemic and the increasingly rigid use of identity politics
by mainstream lesbian and gay rights organizations.203 The queer approach
was concertedly more inclusive than traditional lesbian and gay politics, and
focused on cultivating pride in multiple stigmatized sexual practices in addi-
tion to homosexuality (e.g., BDSM and nonmonogamy).204 The openness of
197 See Emens, supra note 25, at 325 (“A number of prominent poly writers describe R
their embrace of polyamory as fueled by their insights about power and possessiveness in
monogamy and by their desire for autonomy within their relationships.”).
198 Id.
199 See Judith P. Stelboum, Patriarchal Monogamy, in THE LESBIAN POLYAMORY
READER, supra note 170, at 39, 42 (“Feminist scholars state that the origins of monog- R
amy have their source in patriarchal thinking. Viewed as the possessions of the male,
women were used for barter and/or procreation. . . . Legitimacy of a child relates to
acknowledgement of the child’s father, not to the child’s mother.”).
200 Emens, supra note 25, at 325 (“[Prominent poly writers’ embrace] of polyamory R
builds in part on the feminist understanding of monogamy as a historical mechanism for
the control of women’s reproductive and other labor.”).
201 These sexual liberationist and feminist aspects of polyamory distinguish it from
the religiously founded multiparty relationships such as polygyny. See id. at 307 (“[T]he
sex-based hierarchy of traditional Mormon polygyny seems incompatible with the typical
poly dedication to principles of equality and individual growth, causing some polys and
commentators to exclude Mormon polygyny from the umbrella of polyamory.”); Joan
Iversen, Feminist Implications of Mormon Polygyny, 10 FEMINIST STUD. 505, 518 (1984)
(“One cannot truly apply the term ‘feminist’ to the Mormon plural wives because femi-
nism and patriarchal religion are incompatible.”).
202 See supra Part I.B.
203 See Steven Seidman, Symposium: Queer Theory/Sociology: A Dialogue, 12 SOC.
THEORY 166, 172 (1994).
204 MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS
OF QUEER LIFE 66 (1999) (arguing that queer life is about rejecting normativity and in-
cludes “[t]he others, the queers who have sex in public toilets, who don’t ‘come out’ as
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\38-2\HLG202.txt unknown Seq: 34  3-JUN-15 13:31
302 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 38
queer politics to sexual diversity, and the common stigmatization of
nonmonogamy and homosexuality provoked by AIDS-phobia, created a nat-
ural affinity between polyamorous and queer communities.205 In certain
places, such as San Diego, polyamorous activism became closely linked to
queer, and specifically bisexual, activism; for bisexual polyamorists,
nonmonogamy was the path for manifesting their sexual orientation, in that
it allowed them to conduct relationships with people of both genders
simultaneously.206
Another important force in the development of the polyamorous com-
munity was the advent of the internet and its function as a social resource.
Polyamorous activists interviewed by the first author in 2005 were techno-
logically sophisticated, and various technological vocations were over-
represented in the interview sample.207 Currently, there is a wide variety of
internet resources available for polyamorous people who need advice and
help208 as well as a specialized dating website.209 The mainstream dating
website OKCupid caters to non-monogamous clients.210 There are also web-
based “meet-up” groups for the purpose of meeting new potential partners,
as well as befriending other poly people and exchanging advice and
support.211
Offline polyamorous community support systems range from the na-
tional organization, Loving More, which publishes the magazine and runs
two regional conferences per year, to local groups that meet on a regular
basis for social purposes. Most of the first author’s interviewees attended
Loving More weekend workshops and/or workshops run by the Human
Awareness Institute.212 The workshops focus mostly on the emotional man-
agement of polyamorous relationships, and are designed to help attendees
develop skills such as jealousy management, conflict resolution, and the de-
velopment of “compersion”—vicarious joy and empathy for a loved one
who is involved with someone else.213 Online lists such as SfBay-Poly in the
happily gay, the sex workers, the lesbians who are too vocal about a taste for dildos or S/
M, the boys who flaunt it as pansies or as leathermen” and other sexual minorities).
205 This is especially true for bisexual men. The fear of AIDS increased the visibility
of bisexual men, who were blamed for spreading the disease to the straight population.
Interview with Claire, activist (2005) (transcript on file with first author).
206 Id.
207 Aviram, Make Love, Not Law, supra note 26, at 267. R
208 See, e.g., LOVE OUTSIDE THE BOX, http://www.loveoutsidethebox.com, archived
at http://perma.cc/2UA6- BGMK (providing workshops on polyamorous relationships).
209 See POLYMATCHMAKER, http://www.polymatchmaker.com, archived at http://per
ma.cc/R39F-9LG4.
210 See OKCUPID, https://www.okcupid.com, archived at https://perma.cc/573XPH
MB. See also Matt Albrecht, Poly Culture and Online Dating, MODEL VIEW CULTURE
(Sept. 8, 2014), https://modelviewculture.com/pieces/poly-culture-and-online-dating,
archived at https://perma.cc/93F5-W69N.
211 POLYAMORY MEETUPS, http://polyamory.meetup.com, archived at http://perma.cc/
J96P-33J2.
212 See HAI GLOBAL, http://www.hai.org, archived at http://perma.cc/7S66-3PCL.
213 Emens, supra note 25, at 330. R
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San Francisco Bay Area host events on a regular basis, both socially and to
discuss articles and courses of action.214 In addition, various subcultures of
the Bay Area, though not polyamorous by definition, are particularly
friendly to polyamorous individuals; some of these communities include sci-
ence fiction conventions, Pagan and queer forums, the Society for Creative
Anachronism and other historical-recreational venues, and several left-wing,
progressive social milieus.215
C. Polyamorous Perspectives on the Same-Sex Marriage Struggle
There have been, overall, two efforts to gauge the perception of the
marriage equality struggle among polyamorous people. The first was a series
of in-depth interviews conducted by the first author in 2005 with “active and
salient” members of the polyamorous community in the San Francisco Bay
Area.216 The second was the aforementioned large-scale web survey con-
ducted by Loving More and NCSF in 2012.217 While the different methodol-
ogies and populations do not allow for a direct quantitative comparison, the
time difference between the two seems to suggest an increase in community
enthusiasm about the prospect of legal recognition, likely prompted by the
success of the struggle for same-sex marriage.
Polyamorous people, of course, are well aware of the fact that they
cannot be legally married to more than one partner. Since 1862 (and later
amended in 1882 and 1887), federal law has prohibited polygamy,218 and
there have been no attempts, outside the context of Mormon polygamy,219 to
revise the legal status of multiple marriages. Until the mid-2000s, the only
publicized attempt to obtain legal recognition for a polyamorous relationship
involved a child custody battle in Tennessee, between a polyamorous
mother, April Divilbiss, and the paternal grandmother, which ended in the
mother’s loss of custody.220 Most of the first author’s interviewees in 2005
were familiar with the Divilbiss case and mentioned it as a cautionary tale
regarding mobilization for legal rights.221
214 See SFBAY-POLY, http://lists.polyamory.org/listinfo.cgi/sfbay-poly-polyamory.org,
archived at http://perma.cc/6QBS-SP9Q.
215 Aviram, Make Love, Not Law, supra note 26, at 266–67, 276–77. R
216 Id. at 266.
217 What Do Polys Want?, supra note 30. R
218 Act of July 1, 1862 (“Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act”), 12 Stat. 501, repealed by Act of
Nov. 2, 1978 § 2, Pub. L. No 95-584, 92 Stat. 2483, 2483.
219 While traces of the practice of polygamy remained among the Mormon commu-
nity, see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878), the Church of Latter-Day
Saints only renounced the practice in 1890. See Elizabeth Harmer-Dionne, Once a Pecu-
liar People: Cognitive Dissonance and the Suppression of Mormon Polygamy As a Case
Study Negating the Belief-Action Distinction, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1295, 1300 (1998).
220 Emens, supra note 25, at 309–12. R
221 Aviram, Make Love, Not Law, supra note 26, at 278; see also first author’s field R
notes (on file with first author).
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The interviewee group was, overall, very political and active, and there
was a surprising juxtaposition between their vibrant involvement in work-
shops, conferences, meet-ups, potlucks, and other poly-themed events and
their overall lack of enthusiasm for legal mobilization.222 Many of the first
author’s interviewees were dyadic primary couples with lovers outside the
household, who had no desire to legally formalize their relationships with
their secondary partner. The members of “vees,” triads, and quads in the
study, particularly those who had spent several years as a family unit, used
various contractual mechanisms, such as wills, trusts, power-of-attorney
documents, and the like, to mimic some of the economic and logistical as-
pects of marriage and facilitate management of the household.223 These
mechanisms strongly resembled those advocated by attorneys for cohabitat-
ing, unmarried same-sex and opposite-sex couples.224
Beyond the lack of a strong “push” for instrumental rights and benefits,
the first author’s interviewees reported political and cultural reasons for their
reluctance to mobilize legally. Many interviewees expressed disdain of iden-
tity politics225 and a strong sense of individualism and personal agency,
which made them resent governmental interference with their personal and
emotional life.226 The interviewees repeatedly stressed the importance of
freedom and fluidity in personal relationships, which, for them, meant that
seeking the mainstream’s stamp of approval in the form of yet one more
oppressive “box” to check on official forms would be an unwanted
concession.227
The first author attributed this strong support of self-actualization and
visionary individualism in part to the cultural locus of the community she
studied, which had roots in visionary science fiction and fantasy literature as
well as in earth-centered religions,228 but also to the extent to which respon-
dents identified with queer politics and ideology.229 Many of the first author’s
interviewees identified as bisexual or refused to identify as having any par-
ticular sexual orientation.230 Moreover, several interviewees mentioned the
overlap between polyamorous lifestyles, the BDSM and kink community,
222 Aviram, Make Love, Not Law, supra note 26, at 279. R
223 Id. at 269–70 (referencing wills and power-of-attorney documents).
224 See, e.g., Kate Kendell, Gain Legal Protection for Gay Families, in 50 WAYS TO
SUPPORT LESBIAN & GAY EQUALITY 86, 87–88 (Meredith Maran & Angela Watrous eds.,
2005) (“If you’re a same-sex couple living in a state without domestic partner recogni-
tion, make sure you have a will or trust, powers of attorney for health care and finances, a
nomination of guardianship . . . and a co-parenting agreement.”).
225 Aviram, Make Love, Not Law, supra note 26, at 271–72. R
226 Id. at 278.
227 Id. at 279.
228 Hadar Aviram, Geeks, Goddesses, and Green Eggs: Political Mobilization and the
Cultural Locus of the Polyamorous Community in the San Francisco Bay Area, in UN-
DERSTANDING NON-MONOGAMIES 87, 89–90 (Meg Barker & Darren Langdridge eds.,
2010).
229 Aviram, Make Love, Not Law, supra note 26, at 267. R
230 Id.
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and other sex-positive communities.231 As sexual minorities in more than one
way, the interviewees were concerned about the need to go “vanilla” and
present a socially palatable, sex-negative image to the public in the effort to
attain legal recognition.232 The interviewees’ identification with sexual mi-
norities was also important to them in that they understood the same-sex
marriage struggle as incremental.233 Several interviewees mentioned that
same-sex marriage must take precedence over any effort on behalf of poly-
amorous families, saying that their “gay and lesbian brothers and sisters”
deserve “their moment in the sun,” and that it would be timelier for public
opinion to mature into acceptance of multipartner relationships after same-
sex marriage became acceptable.234
The 2012 Loving More and NCSF survey suggests that the passage of
time since the first author’s study, and the success of same-sex marriage
legalization efforts, may have produced more favorable approaches toward
legalization among community members. When presented with the question,
“if it were legal, would you be open to being legally married to more than
one person concurring,” 76.7% of respondents answered “yes.”235 Moreo-
ver, a large majority—91.9% of all respondents and 93.1% of currently un-
married respondents—agreed or strongly agreed with the statement,
“consensual, multiparty marriages among adults should enjoy the same legal
recognition, privileges and obligations as two-party marriages.”236 However,
this seemingly strong support hides a more nuanced and complex under-
standing of the law’s place in intimate relationships. A reported 66.9% of all
respondents, and 70.6% of unmarried respondents, believed that no relation-
ship configuration deserved special recognition or privileges over others, but
the problematic phrasing of the question does not allow us to conclude
whether the privileged “relationship configuration” in the question was mo-
nogamous marriage, multiparty marriage, or any other formalized family ar-
rangement.237 At best, we can conclude that the interest in, and enthusiasm
for, legal recognition for multiparty relationships is complicated by a resent-
ment over prioritization of legally recognized relationships for various legal
aspects. This interpretation is supported by comments from the first author’s
interviewees, who stated, for example, that rather than advocating for health
231 Id. at 273.
232 Id. at 271.
233 Id. at 274.
234 Id.
235 What Do Polys Want?, supra note 30. R
236 Id.
237 Id. The exact phrasing of the question was: “Jones believes that any form of inti-
mate relationship between consenting adults is fine, but that none deserve special recog-
nition or privileges. Smith believes that certain types of relationships are more socially
valuable than others and deserve official recognition and privileges in order to encourage
their formation.” Id. Respondents were asked whether they agreed with Jones or with
Smith. Id.
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care via multipartner marriage, they would prefer to see universal health care
offered to all U.S. residents, regardless of their familial status.238
The renewed interest in legal mobilization and political action is mani-
fested beyond survey answers. Two well-attended community conferences,
the World Polyamory Association’s meeting in the summer of 2013239 and
the annual International Academic Conference on the Future of Monogamy
and Nonmonogamy,240 featured a “political summit” in which various alter-
native approaches to legal recognition were discussed.241 Activists’ explora-
tion of the pros and cons of legal mobilization were notably informed by the
same-sex marriage struggle, and the suggestions made at the summits often
echoed strategies actually employed in the same-sex marriage context, such
as arriving innocently to City Hall and requesting a marriage license for
three people.242
In summary, as this background to the two communities suggests, while
the polyamorous community is far from identical in composition to the gay
liberationists of the 1970s, there are some pertinent similarities that inform
the analysis of legal strategies. Gay liberationist and polyamorous communi-
ties have expressed similar normative commitments to inclusivity and sexual
diversity, as well as a drive for individual autonomy that resists a centralized
or uniform approach to politics.243 Members of these communities also gen-
erally ascribe to progressive political values, rooted in feminist and sexual
liberationist ideals.244 This may explain the ambivalence voiced by members
of both communities around the idea of pursuing marriage rights; while
drawn to marriage, gay liberationists and polyamorists have remained mind-
ful of the problematic nature of marriage as a patriarchal institution that
involves state privileging of certain forms of intimacy over others.245
In addition to these internal similarities, the contemporary polyamorous
community confronts a similar cultural environment to the one confronted
by the gay liberationists of the 1970s. In both communities, conservative
backlash began mounting even before marriage equality efforts were offi-
cially underway; just as conservative rhetoric around the ERA once
prompted preemptive opposition to same-sex marriage,246 conservative rhet-
238 First author’s field notes (on file with first author). Kathy, the interviewee, went on
to discuss how compliance with “check the box” forms regarding relationship status
indicated compliance with marriage-based policies, specifically healthcare policies,
which she was not willing to support. Id.
239 See 2013 Conference, WORLD POLYAMORY ASSOCIATION, http://worldpolyamory
association.net/conferences/2012-poly-con/#.VN5zyfnF-UY, archived at http://perma.cc/
2F26-8QYN.
240 See Monogamy and Nonmonogamy 2015, https://sites.google.com/site/monogamy
andnonmonogamy2015/, archived at https://perma.cc/H6B7-45CW.
241 First author’s field notes (on file with first author).
242 Id.
243 See supra Parts I.A and II.B.
244 See supra Parts I.A and II.B.
245 See supra Parts I.A and II.C.
246 See supra Part I.A.
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oric around same-sex marriage has recently prompted preemptive opposition
to polyamorous marriage.247 Also like the gay liberationists before them,
polyamorists have been abandoned by perceived allies in the wake of this
backlash: feminist advocates of the ERA refused to respond to gay baiting
with a defense of same-sex marriage,248 a striking parallel to the recent
LGBT advocates’ response to the “slippery slope” arguments against same-
sex marriage.249 Thus, while one might assume that the LGBT movement’s
continuous work toward marriage equality since the 1990s would have cre-
ated a cultural opening to alternative marriage structures, winning the legal
battle for polyamorous marriage is just as unthinkable today as winning the
battle for same-sex marriage was during the era of gay liberation.
More generally, LGBT and polyamorous communities are similarly in-
stitutionally situated in a way likely to generate common strategic innova-
tions and raise common challenges. These groups’ subordination arises
largely from the social institutions that define and regulate sexuality.250 One
such institution is the criminal law, which may ban “deviant” sexual con-
duct outright, or prohibit certain practices that sexual minorities may be
siphoned into (like public sex). Same-sex and polyamorous relationships
also face stigmatization due to their exclusion from sexually defined institu-
tions like marriage and traditional definitions of the family. Accordingly,
these communities face similar choices regarding the targets for political
action with regards to their relationships.251
The striking parallels raised here suggest that a prospective poly-
amorous marriage campaign will likely invite similar strategic innovations
and raise similar challenges to those seen in the historical gay liberationist
247 See Jessica Bennett, Polyamory: The Next Sexual Revolution, NEWSWEEK, July 28,
2009, http://www.newsweek.com/polyamory-next-sexual-revolution-82053, archived at
http://perma.cc/QM3W-4HT3 (“‘This group is really rising up from the underground,
emboldened by the success of the gay-marriage movement,’ says Glenn Stanton, the di-
rector of family studies for Focus on the Family, an evangelical Christian group. ‘And
while there’s part of me that says, “Oh, my goodness, I don’t think I could see them make
grounds,” there’s another part of me that says, “Well, just watch them.”’”).
248 CAIN, supra note 48, at 257. R
249 Transcript of Oral Argument at 46–47, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2013) (No. 12-144), archived at http://perma.cc/5YEK-UXTE.
250 Constructivist theories in sociology hold that persistent inequalities tend to be
perpetuated through multiple institutional arenas of society (i.e., law, medicine, science,
media, etc.), which comprise practices and belief systems that privilege one social group
over another. See generally Elizabeth A. Armstrong & Mary Bernstein, Culture, Power,
and Institutions: A Multi-institutional Politics Approach to Social Movements, 26 SOC.
THEORY 74 (2008) (applying a constructivist approach to the study of social movements).
Heteronormativity and monogamy are examples of belief systems that are reinforced
through multiple institutional arenas. Id. at 89 (describing “heteronormativity” as “em-
bedded within major institutions” and explaining the “[m]ultisited nature of
domination”).
251 For example, in seeking legal recognition for their alternative forms of intimacy,
both LGB and polyamorous people are tasked with deciding whether to demand legal
rights to marriage—the ready-made, state-sponsored model of intimacy linked to a pano-
ply of rights and benefits—or whether to avoid marriage and pursue piecemeal forms of
relationship recognition subsumed within marriage. See infra Part III.C.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\38-2\HLG202.txt unknown Seq: 40  3-JUN-15 13:31
308 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 38
marriage campaigns. Our intention in focusing on the commonalities be-
tween these communities is not to make the determinist argument that future
polyamorous marriage activism will closely follow the course of LGBT ac-
tivism. Rather, our aim is to make a case for the utility of the comparative
analysis presented in this Article—to demonstrate that the communities are
sufficiently similar (in their value orientation and in many structural re-
spects) that the LGBT experience will be informative for polyamorists mov-
ing forward. However, as with any comparative research, it is important to
be mindful of differences among the compared groups that are likely to cre-
ate divergence in their actions. For example, polyamorists will likely face
unique pressures derived from factors like: the specific cultural history of
Mormonism in the United States and use of anti-polygamy laws to assimilate
that community;252 the intersecting stigmatization against multiparty mar-
riage derived from Islamophobia and the deep-seated Orientalism in the
West;253 and the politicization of multiparty marriage that has arisen from the
LGBT movement’s same-sex marriage campaign. In the subsequent Parts,
we delve further into these and other community-specific differences that are
likely to become relevant in evaluating strategies for future polyamorous
marriage advocacy.
III. LEGAL AND EXTRALEGAL LESSONS FROM THE
MARRIAGE EQUALITY STRUGGLE
The LGBT movement has much to offer for polyamorous activists who
are contemplating legal mobilization for multiparty marriage or other
nonmarital relationship recognition. In this Part, we map out the set of legal
and cultural strategies that the LGBT movement has developed through its
multiple decades of litigation in this area, assessing which of these tools
would be most relevant to poly activists. Our analysis here draws on the
LGBT experience not only to propose a set of strategic tools that poly activ-
ists might borrow or avoid, but also to understand how the LGBT move-
ment’s own strategic choices may have constrained or enabled the
possibilities for poly activism.
252 See Emens, supra note 25, at 282. Martha Ertman argues that legal restrictions on R
polygamy derive not only from the threat posed by Mormons’ separatism (which chal-
lenged U.S. political cohesion), but also to Mormons’ “social treason” or “adopt[ion of]
a supposedly barbaric [nonwhite] marital form.” Martha M. Ertman, Race Treason: The
Untold Story of America’s Ban on Polygamy, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 287, 287
(2010).
253 A remarkable recent decision by Utah district court Judge Clark Waddoups used
Edward Said’s Orientalism framework in analyzing the legal prohibition of polygamy,
concluding that “the comparison with non-European peoples and their practices is pre-
cisely what made the Mormons’ practice of polygamy problematic.” Brown v. Buhman,
947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1184 (D. Utah 2013). See also Edward W. Said, Orientalism
Reconsidered, in LITERATURE, POLITICS AND THEORY 210 (Barker et al. eds., 1986).
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A. Legal Arguments
1. Legal Arguments to Borrow
One of the first accepted legal arguments in the LGBT marriage strug-
gle was an Equal Protection Clause argument based on sex. This argument
enjoyed great judicial sympathy in one of the first cases to favorably decide
an LGBT rights issue—Baehr v. Lewin, the case discussed in the previous
Part.254 In Baehr, the Supreme Court of Hawaii found that the prohibition of
same-sex marriage constituted discrimination on the basis of sex and re-
quired strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution’s equal protection
clause.255 On remand, the circuit court rejected the State’s arguments that
granting same-sex marriage would harm children, undermine the ability of
Hawaii marriages to be recognized in other jurisdictions, and create sizable
financial implications for the State, and found the State’s prohibitions on
same-sex marriage unconstitutional.256
The reason for this stringent constitutional test was that the court relied
not on the petitioners’ sexual orientation, but on their sex, for the equal pro-
tection analysis. In other words, “because the state treated female-female
and male-male couples differently than female-male couples, it was discrim-
inating because of the sex of one of the partners.”257 The doctrinal appeal of
this argument is obvious: since sex is a suspect classification, relying on sex
as the discriminatory category situates discriminatory marriage laws in the
context of heightened scrutiny, requiring the state to present compelling rea-
sons to deny the right.258
The downside of the sex discrimination argument is its reductionist na-
ture. Although it may be empirically difficult to disentangle animus based on
sex from animus based on sexual behavior,259 outspoken political opposition
to LGBT rights and multiparty relationships in the United States strongly
suggests that status-based animus against these groups—rather than sex-
ism—is what underlies the dominant monogamous, heterosexual marriage
254 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), superseded by constitutional amend-
ment, HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.
255 Id. at 69.
256 Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *18–23 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996). Before this decision was reviewed on appeal, Hawaii citizens voted for a constitu-
tional amendment that allowed the Hawaii Legislature the right to ban same-sex mar-
riages, HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23, as adopted at Gen. Elec. (Nov. 3, 1998) pursuant to
Haw. H.R. Bill No. 117 (1997 Reg. Sess.), which the Legislature subsequently did. HAW.
REV. STAT. § 572-1, as amended by Haw. Sess. Laws 1994, Act 217, § 3.
257 ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 59, at 8. R
258 Cf. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 580.
259 See Zachary A. Kramer, Some Preliminary Thoughts on Title VII’s Intersexions, 7
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 31, 57 (2006) (“While a plaintiff may identify in a variety of ways
and along a series of axes, courts often have trouble parsing between the respective ele-
ments of a plaintiff’s identity.”).
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laws.260 Furthermore, it ignores the strong feeling among many queer activ-
ists—LGBT, poly, and others—that treating gender as a binary is inherently
problematic.261
Moreover, in the context of polyamory, the argument will not be in-
credibly helpful in an era in which same-sex marriage is universally recog-
nized.262 A petitioner who wishes to marry a person of the opposite sex and a
person of the same sex could face the following mandate: either of the mar-
riages is allowed—so as to avoid discriminating against the petitioner on the
basis of sex—but s/he will have to pick which of the two marriages to
pursue.
A more promising legal avenue, therefore, would be an Equal Protec-
tion Clause argument based on sexual orientation. While sexual orientation,
as opposed to race or gender, has not historically been considered a suspect
classification that should trigger a strict scrutiny standard,263 some recent
opinions have awarded it a heightened status. One example is Justice Carlos
Moreno’s notable dissent to the decision to uphold Proposition 8 in Califor-
nia.264 The dissent made it clear that “[t]he question before us is not whether
the language inserted into the California Constitution by Proposition 8 dis-
criminates against same-sex couples and denies them equal protection of the
law; we already decided in the Marriage Cases that it does.”265 Rather, the
260 Cf. Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and
Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471, 503–05 (2001) (arguing that legal claims that
homophobic laws constitute sex discrimination avoid the “actual wrong of discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation”).
261 Diane S. Meier, Gender Trouble in the Law: Arguments Against the Use of Status/
Conduct Binaries in Sexual Orientation Law, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC.
JUST. 147, 163–87 (2008).
262 Cf. ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 59, at 8 (arguing that the “sex R
discrimination analogy provides no basis for arguing that state refusals to give benefits to
cohabiting or polyamorous couples are an invidious kind of discrimination ‘like’ race
discrimination”).
263 In determining whether a group warrants heightened protection under the Equal
Protection Clause, the Supreme Court considers history of discrimination, political
powerlessness, immutability of the characteristic, and relation of the characteristic to
ability to perform or contribute to society. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
684–86 (1973); see also Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEAT-
TLE U. L. REV. 135, 146 (2011) (summarizing the factors for determining suspect classes
as: “(1) prejudice against a discrete and insular minority; (2) history of discrimination
against the group; (3) the ability of the group to seek political redress (i.e., political
powerlessness); (4) the immutability of the group’s defining trait; and (5) the relevancy of
that trait”). Today, the largest hurdle to obtaining heightened scrutiny for sexual orienta-
tion would likely be the “political powerlessness” factor, due to political wins, such as in
same-sex marriage, highly ironic considering that the fact that LGB people have suffered
a history of discrimination is “not much in debate.” Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d
169, 182 (2d Cir. 2012). Meanwhile, the applicability of the immutability factor for LGB
people has been called into substantial question. See Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the
Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 915, 926–27 (1989) (arguing that courts have retreated from immutability).
264 Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 128 (Cal. 2009) (Moreno, J., concurring and
dissenting).
265 Id. at 129.
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question was whether such discrimination could be accomplished through a
constitutional amendment.266 Justice Moreno repeatedly refers to the people
who wished to get married as a “suspect classification,” arguing that dis-
crimination against them “strikes at the core of the promise of equality that
underlies our California Constitution.”267 For Justice Moreno, all disfavored
minorities suffer from a similar rule; it is to defend them that the equal pro-
tection clause—“inherently countermajoritarian” by nature—exists.268 Jus-
tice Moreno’s dissent makes it clear that the discrimination category was
sexual orientation:
Prior to the enactment of Proposition 8, the California Constitution
guaranteed “this basic civil right to all Californians, whether gay
or heterosexual, and to same-sex couples as well as to opposite-sex
couples. . . . In light of the fundamental nature of the substantive
rights embodied in the right to marry—and their central impor-
tance to an individual’s opportunity to live a happy, meaningful,
and satisfying life as a full member of society—the California
Constitution properly must be interpreted to guarantee this basic
civil right to all individuals and couples, without regard to their
sexual orientation.”269
A somewhat different legal tack was adopted by Judge Vaughn Walker
of the District Court of the Northern District of California, who based his
decision that Proposition 8 violated the Constitution on sexual orientation as
well.270 For Judge Walker, however, finding that sexual orientation triggers
strict scrutiny was unnecessary for the ultimate finding of unconstitutional-
ity. According to Judge Walker, given the illegitimacy of the state interest to
ban same-sex marriage, even if sexual orientation were not to be considered
a suspect classification, the state would fail the rational basis test.271
There are several ways for polyamorous activists to benefit from the
sexual-orientation-based equal protection tack, but those would require fash-
ioning a plausible argument according to which, to use Justice Moreno’s ter-
minology, polyamorous people are a “disfavored minority” whose
discrimination “strikes at the core of the promise of equality” offered to all
citizens272—that is, that polyamory should be a suspect classification for the
purposes of equal protection. Traditionally, determinations as to whether a
social group constitutes a suspect classification have included political
powerlessness, a history of discrimination, and an immutable or distinguish-
ing characteristic that bears no relationship to their ability to contribute to
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Id. at 130.
269 Id. at 131.
270 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
271 Id. at 997–1003.
272 Strauss, 207 P.3d at 129 (Moreno, J., dissenting).
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society.273 Like the LGBT activists before them, poly activists will likely
have no trouble making a case for political powerlessness and history of
discrimination; they need only highlight the longstanding political opposi-
tion to multiparty marriage in the United States. Furthermore, poly activists
may also benefit from the LGBT movement’s litigation of the “immutabil-
ity” prong. In the face of queer and scholarly critiques of immutability argu-
ments for sexual orientation,274 LGBT advocates in the mid-1990s
collectively decided to avoid such arguments—even as a means of prevail-
ing in court.275 Instead, LGBT litigators claimed that a showing of immuta-
bility was not actually legally required,276 or they would reframe the legal
definition of immutability (e.g., as a characteristic that is “so integral to their
identity that it would be inappropriate to require them to change it to avoid
discrimination”).277 Courts have increasingly come to agree with LGBT liti-
gators on these points.278 The argument’s increasing traction should support
“suspect classification” arguments for the poly community; a logical paral-
lel claim in the poly context is that one’s orientation toward multiparty rela-
tionships is so integral to one’s identity that one should not have to change it
to avoid discrimination.
An alternative possible path for poly marriage litigation to prevail
under an equal protection argument would be for bisexual polyamorous peo-
ple to make an equal protection claim based on their bisexuality.279 A bisex-
ual person seeking to marry a member of their own sex and a member of the
opposite sex would be the ideal petitioner. However, this approach is not
ideal for several reasons. First, the argument would be limited to a fairly
narrow subset of the polyamorous community, and presumably not available
to heterosexual petitioners wishing to marry several people of the opposite
sex or to gay and lesbian petitioners wishing to marry several people of the
same sex. Second, the argument would face serious logical challenges. Pre-
273 See supra note 263; Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The R
Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 489
(1998) (discussing the factors the Supreme Court has deployed to determine whether a
group is worthy of heightened scrutiny).
274 See generally Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A
Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1994) (arguing that
pro-gay legal arguments should focus not on immutability but on common ground that
adequately represents the self-conceptions of both essentialists and pro-gay
constructivists).
275 William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group
Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1643, 1661
(1997).
276 Id. at 1643.
277 Peter Nicolas, [G]a[y]ffirmative Action: The Constitutionality of Sexual Orienta-
tion-Based Affirmative Action Policies, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 50 (forthcoming 2015).
278 Id.
279 Michael Boucai makes a related claim that because same-sex marriage bans chan-
nel bisexuals into heterosexual relationships, bisexuals may be the ideal carriers of a
Lawrence-based sexual liberty argument for same-sex marriage. Michael Boucai, Sexual
Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage: An Argument from Bisexuality, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
415, 483–86 (2012).
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sumably, the petitioner would try and argue that, but for his/her bisexual
orientation, he/she could marry the two (or more) people he/she loves; but
straight and gay people do not get to marry more than one person. A possible
judicial answer to this argument could be that the petitioner can be married
to men and to women, but not simultaneously, and that the possibility of
divorce or death followed by remarriage sufficiently allows the petitioner to
express his/her bisexual identity. Again, the LGBT movement’s expansion of
immutability might be used here to expand the pursuit of rights on the part
of people whose identity is not as rigidly constructed as genetically or bio-
logically determined identities.
A more inclusive path could be to argue that polyamory itself is a sex-
ual orientation. The benefits here would be that, should the argument suc-
ceed, it could advance the goals of a more diverse population, and that it
addresses, head-on, the issue of marital exclusivity. Even following the re-
treat in LGBT advocacy from “hard-wired” immutability arguments, it is
likely that advocates for the polyamorous community would have to focus
considerable energy to marshal evidence that polyamory is “so fundamental
to one’s identity that a person should not be required to abandon” it to avoid
discrimination.280 To the extent that this definition calls for a showing that
polyamory is “natural,” there have been some efforts in this direction;
Christopher Ryan and Cacilda Jethá’s recent book, Sex at Dawn, uses evolu-
tionary psychology findings to show that humans most resemble communi-
ties of bonobos, for whom sex is a means of social engagement and
closeness, and for whom sexual exchanges and promiscuity are an inexora-
ble part of social life.281 Based on this and other sources, Ann Tweedy argues
that polyamory could be considered a sexual orientation.282 Indeed, for some
poly activists, being polyamorous is a fundamental part of their self-defini-
tion, regardless of their relationship structure at any given time, to the extent
that they report that efforts to be monogamous feel unnatural to them.283
Notably, one of the difficulties with presenting polyamory as integral to a
given person’s identity is that evolutionary psychology does not suggest a
“Kinsey scale” of propensity toward nonmonogamy; rather, it claims that all
humans are, to some degree or other, nonmonogamous.284
A potential practical difficulty of the suspect classification argument
may be that the Supreme Court has not formally granted heightened scrutiny
to any additional groups since the 1970s, when it granted heightened review
280 Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000).
281 CHRISTOPHER RYAN & CACILDA JETHÁ, SEX AT DAWN: HOW WE MATE, WHY WE
STRAY, AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR MODERN RELATIONSHIPS 101–04 (2011).
282 Ann E. Tweedy, Polyamory as a Sexual Orientation, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1461,
1473–1509 (2011).
283 Fieldwork, Dec. 2004–Apr. 2005 (on file with first author).
284 RYAN & JETHÁ, supra note 281, at 98. R
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to gender and illegitimacy classifications.285 Yet recent developments stem-
ming in part from LGBT movement litigation again limit the challenge here.
The Court’s recent LGBT rights jurisprudence has suggested that the Court
may be moving away from hinging review on a formal finding that a classi-
fication falls within one of its traditional three tiers of scrutiny.286 These re-
cent cases, while failing to specifically state a standard of review, have
invalidated anti-LGBT discrimination using a more robust form of constitu-
tional review than traditional rational basis.287 The Court’s language suggests
that its motivation for using such a heightened form of review was that the
regulation in question was so unrelated to its stated goals that it “seems
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects.”288 The long
history of discrimination against multiparty relationships, combined with a
dearth of evidence that multiparty relationships negatively impact the chil-
dren of the parties involved, gives pause to arguments that prohibitions
against the legal union of those relationships is based on rationality rather
than animus. Thus, poly activists may be able to get more searching constitu-
tional scrutiny for discrimination without having to engage with traditional
suspect classification analysis.
But even if polyamory does not come to be regarded as a core aspect of
personhood that is worthy of special constitutional protection, it may be pos-
sible to address the issue by arguing that the state effort to stop multiple
marriages does not even amount to rational basis, as in Judge Walker’s deci-
sion.289 For this line of argument to succeed, the state must not even have a
legitimate interest in forbidding marriage between more than two people.
The arguments presented in Part III.A.2 below would, therefore, need to be
defeated.
Another line of argument would pursue the right to marry not as an
equal protection issue, but rather on a mandate not to infringe upon a funda-
mental right. There is, at this point, no question whether there is a fundamen-
tal right to marry.290 In the context of same-sex marriages, the question
raised by opponents was whether “gay marriage” constituted something en-
285 Lawrence Schlam, Equality in Culture and Law: An Introduction to the Origins
and Evolution of the Equal Protection Principle, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 425, 446–49
(2004).
286 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (decided in the context of a
liberty framework); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013) (arguing for
a broad interpretation of immutability, which consists of an inquiry into whether the
characteristics of a certain class are the basis for its discrimination).
287 See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 755–76
(2011).
288 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
289 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997–1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
290 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men.”).
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tirely different from heterosexual marriage.291 And indeed, much of the
struggle to receive recognition was focused on presenting same-sex mar-
riages as essentially similar—in love, intimacy, sharing of responsibilities,
economic partnership, and a joint project of raising children—to opposite-
sex marriages.292
Similarly, poly marriage advocates will have to argue that, in essence,
the right to marry more than one person is nothing but a subset of the more
general right to marry. Here, previous litigation in the LGBT and feminist
movements has expanded the legal construction of marriage in several ways
that may be helpful for poly people. Feminist arguments around contracep-
tion and abortion have removed procreation as a crucial function of mar-
riage,293 helping advance the conception of “companionate” or romantic
marriage that same-sex marriage litigation has further institutionalized.294
Thus, if poly activists take the fundamental rights approach—arguing that
group marriage enhances the parties’ lives in the same way as couple mar-
riages do—the characteristics of marriage they will have to contend with
will be: the ability to share love and intimacy; the benefits of long-term
commitment; the economic and practical stability of the household; the abil-
ity to distribute responsibilities and chores among the different partners; and
the child-rearing goals for some relationships.295 The courts’ openness to a
due process argument largely depends on what the state will present as its
“legitimate interest” for forbidding group marriage, and two such interests
are analyzed below: child-rearing objections and logistical hurdles.
2. Legal Counterarguments to Watch Out For
The main (at least ostensibly) nonreligious argument brought against
same-sex marriages pertained to the impact of such marriages on children.
291 For a historical perspective on this line of argument, see James Trosino, American
Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REV 93
(1993).
292 Mike Swift, Census Study of Gay Married Couples Finds Similarities to Husband-
Wife Couples, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (June 17, 2009), http://www.mercurynews.com/
breakingnews/ci_12614608?nclick_check=1, archived at http://perma.cc/4PF5-QH3J
(“Demographically, same-sex married couples are more similar to opposite-sex married
couples than to unmarried same-sex partners.”).
293 See, e.g., Nan Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 L. &
SEXUALITY: REV. LESBIAN & GAY ISSUES 9, 17–18 (1991).
294 WALZER, supra note 63, at 139 (noting that “if the primary goal of marriage today R
is to provide love, support, and companionship, then there is no real argument for exclud-
ing same-sex couples from such an arrangement”).
295 See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619–20 (1984) (stating that the
types of relationships that fall within the scope of the constitutionally protected right of
intimate association include those involving family maintenance, cohabitation, and child-
rearing); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 432 (Cal. 2008) (“[P]romoting and facili-
tating a stable environment for the procreation and raising of children is unquestionably
one of the vitally important purposes underlying the institution of marriage and the con-
stitutional right to marry . . . .”).
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This argument came in several flavors: concerns about discouraging procrea-
tion and parenthood by approving partnerships that were not physically ca-
pable of producing biological offspring,296 and concern about the welfare of
children raised by same-sex couples.297 We expect the former variant to be
less of an issue in the context of polyamorous families, many of which in-
volve partners of both sexes, and the recent decisions to strike down legal
provisions that forbid same-sex marriages have repeatedly discredited that
line of thought.298 More thought should be given to the latter variant of the
“think of the children!” argument—namely, the concern that it is unsafe or
ill-advised to legitimize child-rearing in multiparent households. Indeed,
much of the pro-marriage-equality advocacy in the context of same-sex mar-
riages focused on disproving the notion that same-sex couples were not suit-
able for child-rearing.299 Nonetheless, concerns about child-rearing are still
raised in the context of same-sex marriage; in 2014, the State of Utah’s brief
in the same-sex marriage case there cited a discredited study by Mark
Regnerus, a sociology professor at University of Texas at Austin, suggesting
that children are harmed by gay marriage.300 It is, therefore, a reasonable
expectation that such objections will be raised against multiparent
households.
Very little scientific literature addresses parenting and child welfare in
the polyamorous community save for Elisabeth Sheff’s pioneering work.301
Sheff’s work, based on in-depth interviews with adult polyamorous family
members and children, has highlighted several important findings that will
hopefully be expanded upon in future research. Young children, Sheff ob-
serves, are less likely to be preoccupied with their parents’ relationships and
number of partners; they relate to the adult members of the household
through their particular relationship to each adult, such as “willing to be
dressed up” or “bringer of ice cream.”302 Children between nine and twelve
296 Meredith Clark, Arizona Points to Procreation to Defend Gay Marriage Ban,
MSNBC, (July 25, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/arizona-gay-marriage-ban-
about-kids-lawyers-say, archived at http://perma.cc/BA33-UTGZ.
297 Mark Regnerus, How Different Are the Adult Children of Parents Who Have
Same-Sex Relationships? Findings from the New Family Structures Study, 41 SOC. SCI.
RES. 752, 752 (2012).
298 Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 992 (N.D. Cal.
2012), hearing en banc denied, 680 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2012), appeal dismissed, 724
F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Furthermore, to the extent Congress was interested merely in
encouraging responsible procreation and child-rearing by opposite-sex married couples, a
desire to encourage opposite-sex couples to procreate and raise their own children well
would not provide a legitimate reason for denying federal recognition of same-sex
marriages.”).
299 See Zach Wahls Speaks About Family, YOUTUBE (Feb. 3, 2011), https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=yMLZO-sObzQ, archived at https://perma.cc/7GWQ-E6M6.
300 Reply Brief of Appellants Gary R. Herbert & Sean D. Reyes at 67, 76, Kitchen v.
Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (2013) (No. 13-4178) (citing Regnerus, supra note 297). R
301 ELISABETH SHEFF, THE POLYAMORISTS NEXT DOOR: INSIDE MULTIPLE-PARTNER
RELATIONSHIPS AND FAMILIES 135–163 (2014).
302 Id. at 137.
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years old and teenagers tended to be more aware of their parents’ lifestyle
and made several important observations. First, they felt that they received
considerably more attention and supervision than children with monoga-
mous parents—which, while some of them resented it, could be regarded as
a positive phenomenon.303 Second, as Goldfeder and Sheff observe else-
where, they felt that different partners brought into the household different
parenting strengths, often mentioning being able to talk with one of the part-
ners, or being less able to “get away” with behaviors that the other parents
could not cope with.304 Third, the children mentioned that instability in the
household was a source of sadness and stress for them, and that they missed
partners that had left the household.305 With regard to this last category,
Sheff helpfully compares these teens’ experience to that of children of di-
vorced parents, or children in composite families in which some relatives
move away.306 Similar concerns about stability could be raised about those
families, which are not explicitly sanctioned or outlawed.
As more research emerges to support and complement Sheff’s find-
ings,307 the community may be able to effectively counterargue that poly-
amorous families are not, per se, harmful to children. Even in the absence of
such research, we feel that a fruitful counterargument could rely on the com-
parison Sheff makes between polyamorous households and households pro-
duced by serial monogamies, in which people often stay in touch with
former partners and their children while forming new families and having
children with new partners.308 Since the marriages that produce those fami-
lies are not under scrutiny, a comparison could be made, arguing that there is
nothing endemic to polyamory that produces a worse parenting environment.
We expect that divorce and separation statistics may play an important part
in attempting to prove that polyamorous families are not, by definition, less
stable than monogamous ones, and possibly even that separation in poly-
amorous families does not typically leave children with a single parent.
It is also possible that concerns about more than two parents can be
addressed by referring courts to various contexts in which the law is con-
cerned with single parenting, and with the stereotyping of single parenting as
unsuitable for children. If the argument against single parenting relies on the
difficulty of providing resources, supervision, and attention without relief
303 Id. at 139–40.
304 Marc Goldfeder & Elisabeth Sheff, Children of Polyamorous Families: A First
Empirical Look, 5 J.L. & SOC. DEVIANCE 150, 208, 227 (2013), archived at https://perma
.cc/9B8W-78MZ.
305 Id. at 220.
306 SHEFF, supra note 301, at 139, 142, 267. R
307 Some emerging literature examines these questions in the Australian context. See,
e.g., Maria Pallotta-Chiarolli, Polyparents Having Children, Raising Children, Schooling
Children, 7 LESBIAN & GAY PSYCHOL. REV. 48, 48 (2006).
308 See generally SHEFF, supra note 301. Sheff draws upon E. Mavis Hetherington & R
Margaret Stanley-Hagan, The Adjustment of Children with Divorced Parents: A Risk and
Resiliency Perspective, 40 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 129, 129–40 (1999).
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from a second parent, it may well be that multiparent households offer more
of those resources.
But there is another argument that might be made against multipartner
marriages, which is purely logistical. Since many legal and administrative
constructs in the United States rely on the structure of marriage as involving
two parties, multipartner relationships create difficult regulative challenges.
The classic examples of such challenges are in taxation, health care, and
immigration. While opponents to same-sex marriage saw their logistical ar-
guments along these lines rejected,309 logistical concerns regarding mul-
tiparty marriage may not be so easily dismissed. From a logistical
standpoint, legalizing same-sex marriage was hardly a radical move; forms,
legal structures, and administrative processes that take into account dyadic
marriages are already in place, and the only change is gender. In fact, the
changes in tax forms are as minor as the changes in marriage forms,310 and
same-sex partners whose marriages were federally recognized by Windsor
received marriage-based immigration status the very next day.311 By con-
trast, poly marriage advocates will have to confront the state’s interest in
conserving the resources that would be required by the extension of marital
rights and the bureaucratic hassle involved in updating policies, processes,
and forms in the three contexts. We proceed to take each one in turn.
In the tax context, federal tax forms require single people to file as
single and give married people the choice to file jointly or separately.312
While the federal government does not have an explicit policy to reward or
penalize marriage, according to the U.S. General Accounting Office’s most
recent estimates in 2004, there are 198 provisions in the Internal Revenue
Code in which marital status factored into individual tax obligations, and
1,138 federal laws in which benefits received or taxes paid depend in some
way upon marital status.313 Therefore, whether a couple is married or not has
genuine tax consequences. Allowing multiple-partner marriage at the federal
level might mean allowing more than two partners to file jointly as married,
which would require an update of the tax brackets, as well as careful consid-
eration of the tax consequences. It is unclear whether the conventional wis-
309 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 972 (Mass. 2003)
(“Nor can the State’s wish to conserve resources be accomplished by invidious distinc-
tions between classes of citizens.” (internal citations omitted)).
310 See, e.g., Marriage Equality in New York City: Questions and Answers for Same-
Sex Couples and All Those Who Wish to Marry Here, OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK, NEW
YORK CITY, http://www.cityclerk.nyc.gov/html/marriage/same_sex_couples_faq.shtml,
archived at http://perma.cc/M2QK-7MB5.
311 Julia Preston, Gay Married Man in Florida is Approved for Green Card, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 2013, at A11, archived at http://perma.cc/S2GT-5WN8.
312 Heather M. Field, Choosing Tax: Explicit Elections as an Element of Design in the
Federal Income Tax System, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 21, 64 (2010).
313 MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & CAROL A. PETTIT,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43157, THE POTENTIAL FEDERAL TAX IMPLICATIONS OF United
States v. Windsor (Striking Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)): Selected
Issues 1 (2013), archived at http://perma.cc/3V9J-ND5W.
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dom, according to which filing jointly is more advantageous for partners
with different income levels,314 would hold true for partnerships between
three, four, or five people. Currently, it is theoretically possible for working
polyamorous partners to claim nonworking partners as dependents.315 While
this possibility will not apply to the entire polyamorous community, it is
unclear whether marrying all partners and filing jointly would provide an
advantage from the tax perspective.316 In any case, it is clear that allowing
multiple-partner marriages would require substantial tax reform, the difficul-
ties of which could be claimed as a state interest, and which could be over-
come only if courts consider the goal of making marriage available to
multiple partners valuable enough to overcome this hassle.
From the perspective of polyamorous marriage activists, a more palat-
able alternative to asking the government to reform the tax system might be
to join the movement to eliminate the marriage election from tax forms.317
Proponents argue that, as women enter the workplace, dual-earner families
suffer a penalty for joint filing, which is harsher on low-income taxpayers.318
Supporting this movement would generate already-existing allies, and may
do more for equalizing all kinds of families, not only polyamorous ones.
As an aside, multiple-partner marriages could also be suspected of be-
ing pursued with the objective of avoiding the payment of estate taxes,
which nonmarried heirs have to pay in the probate process.319 But this con-
cern is real only to the extent that the financial advantages involved out-
weigh the emotional complications, stigma, and other social implications, of
being openly married to more than one partner, which means this is probably
not a serious concern, or at least not a more serious concern than that of
dyadic marriages pursued for strategic ends.320
314 See Adam Bold, When “Married Filing Separately” Makes Sense, BUSINESS IN-
SIDER, Feb. 28, 2012, http://www.businessinsider.com/the-rare-cases-when-married-filing
-separately-makes-more-sense-2012-2, archived at http://perma.cc/9MFP-AZDZ.
315 One pertinent scenario is as follows: A and B are married and work. C, their third
partner, stays home and cares for the family’s children. A and B could claim C, as well as
the children, as dependents on their tax forms, because the definition of dependent is that
of a nonworking person in the household.
316 See generally William A. Klein, Tax Deductions for Family Care Expenses, 14
B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 917 (1973) (arguing that no careful analysis regarding
familial status was conducted when creating these deductions, and that much opacity
remains).
317 Harvey S. Rosen, Is It Time to Abandon Joint Filing?, 30 NAT’L TAX J. 423,
423–25 (1977).
318 Wendy Richards, An Analysis of Recent Tax Reforms from a Marital-Bias Per-
spective: It Is Time to Oust Marriage from the Tax Code, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 611, 624–26
(2008).
319 Frank S. Berall, Estate Planning Considerations for Unmarried Same or Opposite
Sex Cohabitants, 23 QLR 361, 378 (2004). In fact, estate taxes were the grounds for Edie
Windsor’s lawsuit: United States v. Windsor was won on the premise that requiring Ms.
Windsor to pay estate taxes was an impermissible equal protection violation. 133 S. Ct.
2675, 2682 (2013).
320 For more on this point from a religious polygamous perspective, see Sam Brun-
son, Polygamous Tax Evasion, BY COMMON CONSENT (Feb. 24, 2014), http://bycommon
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A second area of law in which marriage sometimes plays a pivotal role
is health care. Same-sex marriage advocates focused much energy on con-
cerns about marriage-based health insurance,321 as well as on the need to
provide partners with a status that would allow hospital visits.322 These two
issues generate different challenges, with the former addressing the financial
rights of partners vis-à-vis employers, and the latter addressing the obliga-
tions of hospital personnel to partners and partner decision-making on health
issues.
The concern about health insurance raises some issues in the poly-
amorous context that are unaddressed in the same-sex marriage context.
Since health insurance is primarily provided in the United States through
employment,323 extending benefits to more than one adult person beyond the
employee would create a higher burden on the employer. Currently, health
benefits are also extended to children,324 but assuming that children of poly
families receive the benefits through their parents irrespective of the mar-
riage, like children of dyadic families, it will be more of an uphill battle to
advocate for insurance benefits extended to more adults. This may mean that
spousal insurance, like other benefits extended to partners, may need to be-
come a financial benefit in which the employee has to specify to whom they
would like the benefit extended, with a numerical limit on the number of
partners.
Concerns about hospital visits from a patient’s same-sex partner have
raised humanitarian issues of compassion,325 and those may arise in the con-
text of polyamorous partners as well; it seems like this may be sorted out
through legislation specifically requiring hospitals to allow any partners of
the patient to visit. A contractual solution may be advisable in the context of
consent.com/2014/02/24/polygamous-tax-evasion, archived at http://perma.cc/CTF9-RD
WR.
321 Michelle Andrews, Some Same-Sex Couples Denied Family Policies on Insurance
Marketplaces, ADVOCATE.COM (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.advocate.com/health/2014/
02/11/some-same-sex-couples-denied-marketplace%E2%80%99s-family-policies,
archived at http://perma.cc/BM5R-HPB2.
322 See Sunnivie Brydum, WATCH: Gay Man Arrested in Mo. for Refusing to Leave
Partner’s Hospital Bedside, ADVOCATE.COM (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.advocate.com/
politics/marriage-equality/2013/04/11/watch-gay-man-arrested-mo-refusing-leave-part
ners-hospital, archived at http://perma.cc/2E6Q-JLKU.
323 See Margaux J. Hall, Who’s the Boss?: Why Are Our Employers Making Our
Health Insurance Choices in the First Place?, SLATE (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.slate
.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/03/when_did_we_decide_it_was_ok
_to_let_our_bosses_choose_our_health_insurance.html, archived at http://perma.cc/23
FF-QBKL.
324 See Covering Young Adults Through Their Parents’ or Guardians’ Health Policy,
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/
dependent-health-coverage-state-implementation.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/JV2P-
7PDS.
325 See Nancy Polikoff, HHS Proposed Regs on Hospital Visitation Ignore the Needs
of Those Incapable of Naming Visitors, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE (June
25, 2010), http://beyondstraightandgaymarriage.blogspot.com/2010/06/hhs-proposed-
regs-on-hospital.html, archived at http://perma.cc/FM64-443K.
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decision-making power for patients unable to express their will.326 Contro-
versies abound in struggles between spouses and parents of adult patients,
such as the infamous struggle concerning Terry Schiavo.327 With the adop-
tion of New York’s Family Health Care Decisions Act in 2010,328 Missouri is
now the only state that does not regulate individuals’ rights to make health-
care decisions on behalf of their partners.329 State regimes are complemented
by federal law,330 which expands the decision-making power of partners. Is-
sues of spousal precedence in healthcare decision-making loomed large in
debates about gay rights and same-sex marriage.331 The universal solution to
the problem is to sign an advance healthcare directive, in which a person
assigns the power to make healthcare decisions to whomever he or she
wishes, be it a legal spouse, a partner, a relative, or a friend.332
A bitter struggle might take place in the immigration arena. The United
States grants immigrant visas (“green cards”) and, consequently, citizenship
to spouses of American citizens.333 While providing immigration status to
same-sex partners of American citizens occurred almost immediately after
the decision in United States v. Windsor,334 immigration authorities may be
concerned about sham multiple marriages created solely for the purpose of
immigration. Currently, immigration officials conduct interviews with
spouses to ensure the genuineness of the marriage,335 and there is no reason
why such interviews cannot be conducted with more than two partners;
given the relatively small percentage of the population involved in mul-
tiparty relationships, the costs and logistical hassle will probably be negligi-
ble. As it is, a finding that a prospective U.S. entrant professes belief in
nonmonogamy in his or her country does not preclude receiving immigration
326 The recommendation frequently made to families is to create power-of-attorney
documents. See Kendell, supra note 224, at 87–88. R
327 Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005).
328 NY Public Health §§ 63.3-a et seq.
329 Jacob Appel, Finally Give N.Y. Families End-of-Life Decisionmaking Power, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Sept. 6, 2009), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/finally-give-n-y-fam-
ilies-end-of-life-decisionmaking-power-article-1.402420, archived at http://perma.cc/
895J-B66E.
330 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L.
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42
U.S.C.).
331 See generally Rebecca K. Glatzer, Equality at the End: Amending State Surrogacy
Statutes to Honor Same-Sex Couples’ End-of-Life Decisions, 13 ELDER L.J. 255
(2005) (arguing that state surrogate laws should be amended to include nontraditional
family members as decision-makers).
332 This is a recommendation frequently extended to any person, regardless of marital
status. See Advance Care Directives, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, http://www
.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/about-ethics-group/ethics-re
source-center/end-of-life-care/advance-care-directives.page?, archived at http://perma.cc/
8VSR-EHLG.
333 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012).
334 See Preston, supra note 311. R
335 David Seminara, Hello, I Love You, Won’t You Tell Me Your Name: Inside the
Green Card Marriage Phenomenon, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Nov. 2008),
http://cis.org/marriagefraud, archived at http://perma.cc/4BN7-32XK.
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status,336 but practicing polygamy, and intending to practice it in the United
States, would preclude him or her from receiving an immigrant visa.337
Interestingly, immigration law must not have anticipated modern, non-
religious polyamory, as it specifically refers to bigamy based on “historical
custom or religious practice.”338 But any argument attempting to distinguish
between customary or religious polygamy and nonreligious polyamory
might leave the arbitration power as to which multiparty marriage is “legiti-
mate” in the hands of immigration officials, which would be highly prob-
lematic. Not only could this create undue discrimination, but absent a change
in our approach toward nonmonogamy in general, any nonmonogamous per-
son admitted to the United States on the basis of such a distinction would
have to deny—as traditional polygamists do when undergoing immigration
proceedings—that he or she intends to practice nonmonogamy after immi-
gration, which would defeat the purpose of granting him or her spousal-
based immigration status. It is clear, therefore, that if and when multipartner
marriage is recognized nationally, immigration law will have to be carefully
and thoughtfully revised.
In summary, polyamorous marriage legal advocates may rely on similar
legal arguments to those that same-sex marriage advocates successfully used
in court, though they will likely face many new challenges regarding the
logistics of legalizing multipartner marriages. We now turn to non-legal
dimensions of the marriage equality struggle and their impact on the poly-
amorous community.
B. Extralegal Strategies and Challenges
In her article Evaluating Legality, Idit Kostiner argues that activists for
legal change view the role of law through three main schemas: instrumental
(pursuit of actual, material rights),339 political (galvanization of political
power for the movement),340 and cultural (reception of symbolic recognition
and value).341 At the end of the article, Kostiner hypothesizes that, as move-
ments grow and mature, they progress from mere instrumental goals to polit-
ical and cultural goals.342
336 U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 9–§ 9 FAM 40.101 Notes,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87124.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/RE
4D-H4F8.
337 Id. (An alien may be ineligible for an immigrant visa “if the alien purposely mar-
ried more than one wife or husband at the same time based on historical custom or relig-
ious practice”).
338 Id.
339 Idit Kostiner, Evaluating Legality: Toward a Cultural Approach to the Study of
Law and Social Change, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 323, 335 (2003).
340 Id. at 339.
341 Id. at 342.
342 Id. at 364.
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As same-sex marriage gained mainstream support subsequent to the
completion of the first author’s 2005 study on the poly activist community in
the San Francisco Bay Area, the polyamorous community may have devel-
oped more of a taste for the political and cultural benefits of legal activ-
ism.343 We now turn to those, and to the extralegal hurdles of cultural
backlash.
1. Strategies to Adopt
The LGBT movement has experienced a number of extralegal benefits
as a result of its advocacy around marriage, which poly activists could effec-
tively adopt. As the history of same-sex marriage activism demonstrates, the
movement’s focus on marriage helped galvanize the community around the
clearly salient issue of relationship recognition, even if its prioritization over
other issues was debatable. As Part I shows, pursuing marriage licenses in
the early days of gay liberation was a radical, politically transformative act,
and it was only later in the history of the movement that it became the vehi-
cle of instrumental rights. Similarly, marriage could potentially play a galva-
nizing role for poly activists, to the extent that their reluctance to pursue it
for political and cultural reasons is less strong. As to the political rationales,
polyamorous marriage advocates may find that, in the post-Windsor, post-
Perry era, focusing on marriage would no longer constitute a risk of sabo-
tage of LGBT struggles, especially given the now commonplace public sup-
port for same-sex marriage.
But beyond these tactical considerations, in considering whether to
make marriage the focal point of mobilization, the movement will have to
overcome its traditional support of free-form, fluid self-determination, free
of structural mandates. In 2005, polyamorous interviewees highlighted how
important it was for them not to be told “how to do polyamory right,” and
some of them expressed negative feelings toward certain workshop or-
ganizers whose presentation of agreements, jealousy management, and other
polyamory relationship practices were, in the interviewees’ opinion, patron-
izing.344 Several interviewees also highlighted their strong affinity with the
BDSM community, which consistently receives questionable and controver-
sial press coverage, stressing that going “vanilla” for the purpose of achiev-
ing legal recognition would be too high a price to pay.345 In a similar vein,
one important cultural lesson poly activists might take from the LGBT
movement’s experience dovetails with the concerns raised by polyamorous
interviewees in 2005: the choice whether to portray polyamorous partner-
ships as unique and different from mainstream culture or as similar to mo-
nogamous partnerships.
343 See supra Part II.C.
344 Aviram, Make Love, Not Law, supra note 26, at 281. R
345 Id. at 271–74.
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In response to these concerns, it is important to keep in mind that the
same-sex marriage issue, despite its unifying power, always generated cri-
tique from queer and feminist scholars arguing against heteronormativity
and assimiliationism,346 and that pursuing legal recognition of relationships
for those who want them has not precluded the LGBT community from
other strands of activism over the years. It is therefore recommended that,
like the LGBT community, the polyamorous community adopt a “suits and
streets” approach, simultaneously pursuing legal rights in the courtroom and
with the legislature and focusing on more radical expressions and goals in
public venues, protests, and the media. It may also well be that, before major
achievements can occur in the legal arena, poly activists will have to come
to the conclusion that the immense symbolic power of marriage in the
United States, and the political legitimacy it garners, is well worth the price
of assimilation.
In Same Sex Marriage: The Cultural Politics of Love and Law, Kath-
leen Hull showed how, before the legalization and recognition of same-sex
marriage across many states, same-sex couples recurred to symbolic affirma-
tions of their relationships via public commitment rituals, demonstrating
how much the appeal to the aesthetics and cultural understandings of mar-
riage meant to the couples that engaged in them.347 Similarly, Kimberly
Richman’s more recent License to Wed included a wealth of interviews with
same-sex couples who spoke of the acceptance of their relationships as legit-
imate and real by family and friends because of the official “stamp” of
marriage.348
Similar issues of acceptance by the outside world are prevalent in the
polyamorous community. Polyamorous people report, in the context of ther-
apy, that their nonconventional relationships have caused them alienation
from family members and friends who are unable to accept their lifestyle,349
346 See, e.g., ELIZABETH BRAKE, MINIMIZING MARRIAGE: MARRIAGE, MORALITY, AND
THE LAW 120 (2012) (“[S]ome theorists of lesbian, gay, and bisexual oppression have
rejected same-sex marriage altogether, arguing that the marital ideal is a heterosexual
paradigm.”).
347 KATHLEEN E. HULL, SAME SEX MARRIAGE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF LOVE
AND LAW 28 (2006).
348 KIMBERLY D. RICHMAN, LICENSE TO WED: WHAT LEGAL MARRIAGE MEANS TO
SAME-SEX COUPLES 152 (2014).
349 GERI WEITZMAN, JOY DAVIDSON & ROBERT A. PHILLIPS, JR., NAT’L COAL. FOR
SEXUAL FREEDOM, WHAT PSYCHOLOGY PROFESSIONALS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT POLY-
AMORY 12 (2010), http://instituteforsexuality.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/What-
therapists-should-know-about-Polyamory-1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/H5XG-5G
HK (discussing the fear and stress polyamorous individuals may feel due to keeping their
polyamorous relationship secret or leading double lives, family disapproval, and chal-
lenges of disclosure to children); see also Keely Kolmes & Ryan G. Witherspoon, Sexual
Orientation Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Expanding our Conversations About
Sexual Diversity: Part I, INDEP. PRACTITIONER 96, 98 (Summer 2012), http://
www.drkkolmes.com/docs/kolmes.witherspoon.microaggressions.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/Q9CE-JYHF (arguing that therapists should validate multiple partners of pa-
tients who experience rejection of their family structure by family and friends).
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difficulties in joining social organizations such as churches,350 and some-
times even harassment by adult children seeking to break up their parents’
relationships with other partners.351 The combination of a more positive pub-
lic opinion and legal recognition may yield the cultural acceptance that these
activists yearn for.
Yet in striving toward cultural acceptance, polyamorous activists must
be aware of the possible cultural repercussions of this strategy. The recent
visibility of multiparty marriage in the mainstream media provides one ex-
ample of how public exposure to multiparty relationships might reinforce
stereotypes, even if the ostensible intention is to normalize those relation-
ships. In the last decade, there has been an explosion of coverage of, and
interest in, polyamorous relationships and lifestyles.352 The first television
show to portray a nonmonogamous family, Big Love,353 was a fictional ac-
count of the life of a Mormon businessman married to three women; the
show veered between showing the family’s everyday life as normal and
mainstream and highlighting the nonconventional, and sometimes alarming,
aspects of life in the household and in their extended family, including fam-
ily members living in a religious compound.354 Additionally, two reality
shows have explored nonmonogamy in very different ways: Sister Wives
depicts Kody Brown and his four wives, Meri Brown, Janelle Brown, Chris-
tine Brown, and Robyn Sullivan, portraying a normal, low-drama life,355
while Polyamory: Married & Dating focuses on nonmainstream, countercul-
tural young people in the Los Angeles area, portraying their lives as a con-
tinuum of drama, orgies, and unstable couplings.356 If the community
chooses a more mainstream path, its representation in the media may also
include child-rearing, household chores, mortgages, and jobs, as the media
did for same-sex couples in Queer as Folk and The L Word.357
350 See Polyamory & Christians, UNITARIAN UNIVERSALISTS FOR POLYAMORY
AWARENESS (Apr. 2013), http://www.uupa.org/Literature/Christians.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/A7G3-3Q68 (attempting to address poly families within the Universalist
Unitarian church).
351 One of the first author’s interviewees, a member of a quad, told of the children of
one of her partners who outed their father in church and alienated his church-member
friends from him until he “reformed” and renounced all partners to whom he was not
legally married (interview on file with first author).
352 Emanuella Grinberg, Polyamory: When Three Isn’t a Crowd, CNN (Oct. 26,
2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/26/living/relationships-polyamory/, archived at
http://perma.cc/UN4K-BBPT.
353 Big Love (HBO television broadcast Mar. 2006–Mar. 2011).
354 See Thomas Buck, Jr., From Big Love to the Big House: Justifying Anti-Polygamy
Laws in an Age of Expanding Rights, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 939, 942–43 (2012).
355 Sister Wives (TLC television broadcast Sept. 2010–present).
356 Polyamory: Married & Dating (Showtime television broadcast July 2012–
present).
357 See generally NIALL RICHARDSON, CLARISSA SMITH & ANGELA WERNDLY, STUD-
YING SEXUALITIES: THEORIES, REPRESENTATIONS, CULTURES 74–75 (2013) (analyzing
representation of lesbians on television).
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2. Extralegal Challenges to Watch Out For
One concern associated with litigation for rights is the fear of political
and social backlash. Indeed, one of the most common critiques of the LGBT
impact litigation strategy was the “narrow” use of the courts rather than the
usage of more democratic appeals. Some commentators, like Michael Klar-
man, attribute the enactment of the Defense of Marriage Act to the judicial
decision in Baehr.358 According to Klarman, the decision was perceived as
undue judicial activism, producing federal legislation that limited marriage
to one man and one woman.359 This interpretation follows, to some extent,
the logic of Gerald Rosenberg’s The Hollow Hope.360 Based on several exam-
ples, including Brown v. Board of Education361 and its aftermath, Rosenberg
argues that seeking rights in the courtroom tends to produce social and polit-
ical backlash and sometimes an adverse legislative or regulative response.362
But critics of Rosenberg’s approach argue for a more nuanced under-
standing of the relationship between litigation and rights, according to which
legal victories can, over time, actually facilitate public acceptance even if
there is an initial backlash.363 Moreover, recent commentary on the same-sex
marriage struggle argues that the preemptive anti-gay-marriage
countermovement actually served as a catalyst for the very processes it
sought to prevent and destroy.364
The deep cultural stigma against multiparty marriage in the United
States suggests that a poly marriage campaign would likely face an organ-
ized conservative backlash of at least the same intensity as the backlash to
same-sex marriage. Polyamory is deeply threatening to the mainstream in
several psychological and historical ways. While political moderates might
not be concerned that providing gay and lesbian people with rights will “in-
fect” heterosexual people with a “gay agenda” or a “gay lifestyle,” poly-
amory strikes at the core of an issue that is pertinent to the life of anyone
who has experienced, or is contemplating, questions of love, relationships,
and long-term commitment. Fidelity and loyalty, especially through the
gendered prism of female chastity, have been fundamental concepts in the
creation of the relatively new institution of romantic marriage.365 Concerns
about abandonment, jealousy, infidelity, and betrayal are at the heart of
358 KLARMAN, supra note 62, at 212. R
359 Id.
360 ROSENBERG, supra note 149, at 355–419. R
361 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
362 ROSENBERG, supra note 149, at 355–419. R
363 See, e.g., Thomas Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Deci-
sions on LGBT Rights, 43 L. & SOC’Y REV. 151, 152 (2009).
364 See generally Dorf & Tarrow, supra note 151 (exploring interview data suggesting R
that the LGBT movement was brought to the fight for marriage equality by the anticipa-
tory countermobilization of social conservatives who opposed same-sex marriage before
there was a realistic prospect of recognition by the courts or political actors).
365 STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: HOW LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE
15 (2006).
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much of mainstream discourse regarding romantic commitment. Marriage
vows include an edict to “forsak[e] all others.”366 Sexual betrayal, which is
a fairly common phenomenon in monogamous marriages,367 is constructed in
Western culture as a deal breaker and a legitimate reason for ending the
relationship, and even when partners are encouraged to attempt reconcilia-
tion, the process can be long and reflect deep trauma.368 Mainstream culture
holds a great deal of attachment to the idea of sexual exclusivity, and sub-
verting this ethos—albeit, ironically, in the opposite way, honestly and ethi-
cally—can constitute a great threat to the symbolic power of sexual fidelity.
Moreover, nonmonogamy has yielded very strong antagonistic feelings in
the United States, specifically in the context of the historical prohibition of
Mormon polygamy in Utah, whose constitution states that plural marriages
are “forever prohibited.”369
It is, however, notable that a recent Utah bigamy prosecution against
the polygamous Brown family, protagonists of the aforementioned reality
show Sister Wives, was dropped.370 A subsequent civil lawsuit on behalf of
the Browns371 resulted in a judicial decision that struck down the anti-cohab-
itation portion of Utah law as unconstitutional,372 based in part on a privacy
rationale not unlike the one in Lawrence v. Texas.373 Though the prohibition
on polygamous marriage remained in effect, commentators considered the
law “weakened” by the decision.374 The decision is a small but symbolically
important victory for multiparty relationships.
366 See Traditional “I Do” Vows, WEDDED YOUR WAY OFFICIANT SERVICES, http://
www.weddedyourway.com/traditional-i-do-vows.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5U
XG-SN3R (exemplifying traditional wedding vows).
367 See Judith Treas & Deirdre Giesen, Sexual Infidelity Among Married and Cohab-
iting Americans, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 48, 48 (2000) (reporting that between 1.5% and
3.6% of married people had had sex with a secondary partner in the past year).
368 See generally Paul R. Amato & Denise Previti, People’s Reasons for Divorcing:
Gender, Social Class, the Life Course, and Adjustment, 24 J. FAM. ISSUES 602, 621
(2003) (finding that infidelity is the leading reported cause for divorce); Mark H. But-
ler & Stephen T. Fife, The Process of Couple Healing Following Infidelity: A Qualitative
Study, 6 J. COUPLE & RELATIONSHIP THERAPY 1, 10 (2006) (arguing that the process of
healing a relationship from the trauma of infidelity is nonlinear).
369 UTAH CONST. art. III.
370 “Sister Wives” Criminal Charges Case Dropped in Utah, ABC 7 NEWS (June 1,
2012), http://www.wjla.com/articles/2012/06/-sister-wives-criminal-charges-case-
dropped-in-utah-76552.html, archived at http://perma.cc/NT7P-XKKA.
371 Reality TV Show Polygamist and His Four Wives Challenge Utah’s Bigamy Laws
With Support from Their Fellow “Sister Wives,” DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Jan. 18, 2013),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2264326/Sister-Wives-lawsuit-Polygamist-
Kody-Brown-4-wives-challenge-Utahs-bigamy-laws.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
R8DT-6PJK.
372 Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1218–21 (D. Utah 2013); see also Bill
Mears, Judge Strikes Down Part of Utah’s Polygamy Law in “Sister Wives” Case, CNN
(Dec. 16, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/2S5X-NB4D.
373 539 U.S. 558, 564–65 (2003).
374 John Schwartz, A Utah Law Prohibiting Polygamy is Weakened, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
15, 2013, at A24, archived at http://perma.cc/9XV7-DQMH.
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In addition to the negative stigma from mainstream culture, poly-
amorous activists frequently complain of antagonism and lack of support
from the LGBT community—the very community they wanted to support by
suppressing their own potential aspirations to legal recognition.375 A recent
poll in the LGBT magazine The Advocate found close to 70% of respondents
opposing multipartner marriage.376 Polyamorous activists need to combat
these negative opinions by reaching out to LGBT activists and reminding
them of the support they received from the poly community during their
struggle for marriage equality.
C. Alternatives to Marriage
While polyamorous marriage activists can learn much from same-sex
marriage advocacy, they might also learn important lessons from periods and
phases in the equality struggle in which activists prioritized other issues over
marriage, or perceived them as worthy stepping stones on the way to full
equality. Here, we consider two such strategies: antidiscrimination struggles,
including workplace discrimination and the struggle against bullying, and
various forms of nonmarital relationship recognition, including child custody
arrangements, adoption, employment benefits, immigration status for
nonmarried partners, and regulatory regimes akin to domestic partnerships
that provide bundles of rights that mimic some aspects of marriage.
1. Anti-Discrimination, Anti-Bullying
Looking outside the sphere of relationship recognition and into areas of
public life, such as employment and education, might be a more hopeful
strategy for poly activists seeking quicker signs of progress for polyamorous
individuals. In the LGBT movement’s case, litigation targeting the public
realm gained cultural and legal acceptance more quickly than litigation
targeting the private realm.377 In terms of cultural acceptance, employment
discrimination was one of the arenas in which public opinion regarding the
LGBT community changed most quickly, with a majority turning in favor of
workplace protections for sexual orientation as early as the 1990s.378 Mean-
while, public opinion on relationship recognition and same-sex marriage has
remained steadily negative, experiencing an uptick only very recently.379 In
terms of legal victories, Patricia Cain has pointed out that “the greatest
375 Aviram, Make Love, Not Law, supra note 26, at 273–74. R
376 The Advocate Poll, supra note 36, at 10. R
377 CAIN, supra note 48, at 167. R
378 ANDREW R. FLORES, WILLIAMS INST., NATIONAL TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION ON
LGBT RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 25 (2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4J8G-
LR7M.
379 See Marriage, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/117328/marriage.aspx, arch-
ived at http://perma.cc/BAG6-L3RB.
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gains” in the first few decades of LGBT impact litigation “were in the pub-
lic sphere,” such as in the areas of free speech and public education.380 The
movement at the time saw far fewer victories in the area of family law;
“[n]o court ruled in favor of recognizing the legal right of lesbian and gay
partners to share their lives, to be together, to claim that they were a
family.”381
Employment discrimination is a particularly advantageous area for pur-
suing rights and public recognition because it appeals to a dominant sensibil-
ity according to which employment should reflect merit rather than
discriminatory notions unrelated to the job. However, litigation in this con-
text should be pursued deliberately and carefully, as some areas of employ-
ment may be easier to litigate than others; for example, LGBT activists have
faced more problems in the context of employment in K-12 education.382 It is
important to point out that this public sensibility has been fueled by the
rhetoric of previous civil rights struggles and judicial interpretation, which
define discrimination as irrational individual animus.383
In recent years, much of the energy of the LGBT community in the
public rather than private sphere has been directed toward anti-bullying cam-
paigns, through initiatives such as the It Gets Better initiative384 and the
Trevor Project,385 which attract many straight allies to empower gay children,
teens, and adolescents and protect them from harm. Similar energies can be
put into protecting children in multiparent families from harassment and has-
sle regarding their family structure.
2. Nonmarital Relationship Recognition
Other avenues that polyamorous activists may choose to focus on, in
lieu of formal marriage or as a precursor to it, are various forms of relation-
ship recognition. One particularly important issue pertains to parental rights.
There have been documented cases in which polyamorous people have lost
custody of their children because of judicial antipathy toward their family
380 CAIN, supra note 48, at 167. R
381 Id.
382 See generally Jeffrey I. Bedell, Personal Liability of School Officials Under
§ 1983 who Ignore Peer Harassment of Gay Students, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 833–47
(2003) (arguing that current interpretations of Title IX and Title VII cannot redress anti-
gay harassment).
383 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimina-
tion Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 45 (2006) (stating the intent-based understanding of dis-
crimination is evident in both the decline in disparate impact doctrine and courts’
hesitation to read disparate treatment doctrine as embracing implicit or subconscious
bias).
384 IT GETS BETTER PROJECT: GIVE HOPE TO LGBT YOUTH, www.itgetsbetter.org/,
archived at http://perma.cc/M9LY-T4FB.
385 THE TREVOR PROJECT, www.thetrevorproject.org/, archived at http://perma.cc/
Y5S8-DZNS.
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structure,386 but there are already documented early successes in which sta-
ble, normative, responsible three-parent families have prevailed in custody
battles.387 The availability of three-parent adoption as a legal recourse was
not intended to accommodate polyamorous parents—indeed, when hailed by
supportive politicians in the media, the examples provided included amica-
ble divorces and same-sex couples in close communication with the biologi-
cal parent388—but it can be a useful legal vehicle in such cases. Additionally,
as mentioned above in our discussion of health care, flexible negotiation of
employment benefits might not generate a problem for the employer as long
as, for example, the employee chooses which of his or her partners is to
receive the benefits.
As explained in Part II above, LGBT impact litigation in the early
1990s prioritized these alternative means of relationship recognition, garner-
ing so much support that same-sex marriage antagonists argued later that the
existence of civil unions and domestic partnerships rendered same-sex mar-
riage unnecessary.389 It is perhaps difficult, but not impossible, to imagine
that such alternative frameworks may be more palatable to the mainstream
public, who might understand the need for a “special arrangement” for a
few unique nonmonogamous families without changing the framework of
the institution of marriage.
3. The Shadow of Marriage
In light of these alternative litigation options, why should polyamorous
activists be concerned with marriage? It may be that, even if polys decide to
pursue nonmarital forms of relationship recognition, the incredible cultural
and social resonance marriage has in defining what relationships are worthy
of legal protection will make it an impossible subject for poly activists to
avoid. As discussed in Part I.C, even when LGBT activists have pursued
alternatives to marriage, it has been exceedingly difficult for them not to use
marriage as a key reference point and model for arguments regarding the
types of relationships that merit recognition.390
386 See PolyFamily Child Custody Case Ends After 2 Year Battle, POLYAMORY SOCI-
ETY, http://www.polyamorysociety.org/Divilbiss_Families_Case_Ends.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/UC52-NACA (explaining the April Divilbiss case).
387 Amy Nash-Kille and her two husbands prevailed in such a case in Portland, Ore-
gon, and have also achieved a three-parent adoption of their children. Amy Nash-Kille,
Presentation at the University of California Hastings College of the Law Criminalization
and Social Control Seminar (Oct. 6, 2014); Amy Nash-Kille, Presentation at the Interna-
tional Conference on the Future of Monogamy and Nonmonogamy in Berkeley, CA (Feb.
23, 2014).
388 Ian Lovett, Measure Opens the Door to Three Parents, or Four, N.Y. TIMES, July
13, 2012, at A9, archived at http://perma.cc/JFN9-NBAA.
389 See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 909 A.2d 89, 94–96 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 2006) (same-sex couples could not establish discrimination based on sex because of
the state’s civil union law granting equal benefits).
390 See supra Part I.C; see also NeJaime, Before Marriage, supra note 82, at 113. R
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Furthermore, even if attorneys in the nonmarital same-sex relationship
recognition cases had chosen to highlight alternative sexual affiliations and
family structures that were not “marriage-like,” it is unclear what meaning
the public or the courts would take away from those narratives.391 Marriage
is so deeply embedded within dominant cultural definitions of intimacy, or
as a dominant cultural schema for understanding and evaluating intimate
relationships,392 that it is difficult to imagine it would not end up playing a
role in any public poly relationship recognition campaign. Indeed, media
coverage of the LGBT movement’s nonmarital recognition cases of the
1990s often framed them as proto-marriage-equality cases, attributing the
cases’ origins to marriage laws that were out of touch with an emerging
social reality.393
Poly advocates should consider the danger that their litigation cam-
paigns—regardless of whether they directly advocate for poly marriage or
whether they advocate for nonmarital forms of poly relationship recogni-
tions—are prepared to evoke public scrutiny of poly relationships that holds
those relationships to the dominant marriage-like frame for intimate adult
relationships. It may be possible for the immense symbolic potential of mar-
riage to work to the advantage of poly advocates, helping them usher in
relationship recognition mechanisms under the backdrop of marriage as a
powerful frame for garnering legitimacy. Yet polyamorous activists must
strongly consider how evoking marriage may just as soon work to assimilate
poly communities as to offer a stepping stone to more transformative visions
of intimacy, which may lead to socio-legal outcomes that are more to the
liking of some polyamorous people than others, and more conducive to sup-
port some poly relationship structures than others.
IV. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Taken together, the analysis in Part III suggests that the LGBT legal
mobilization may have produced conflicting pressures for the contemporary
poly community. On one hand, we have identified numerous areas in which
same-sex marriage litigation has expanded the doctrinal resonance of legal
arguments in favor of polyamorous marriage (or other forms of relationship
recognition). Yet a theme that also emerges from this analysis is how LGBT
legal mobilization for same-sex marriage may have reinforced cultural stig-
mas against polyamorous relationships. This Part turns to further considering
this possibility, and its implications for the scholarly understandings of law
and social movements.
391 See supra Part I.C (discussing the media’s framing of relationship recognition
cases in marital terms).
392 See Areila R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 957, 1009 (2000).
393 See Stroock, supra note 136; Margolick, supra note 137. R
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What effect has LGBT movement advocacy for same-sex marriage had
on cultural constructions of polyamorous people? At the very least, same-sex
marriage litigation appears to have opened the door to a renewed national
discussion about multiparty marriage. As noted earlier, the issue of poly-
amory (or polygamy) is often raised in same-sex marriage cases as part of
the inevitable “slippery slope” argument against expanding marriage to
LGB couples. The inevitable slippery-slope-to-polygamy arguments that
arise in same-sex marriage litigation are often centrally featured in media
coverage of those cases,394 providing a compelling hook for reader interest.
To the extent that this coverage connects multiparty marriage to a frighten-
ing possible consequence of same-sex marriage recognition, the media is
unlikely to ameliorate polyamory’s stigmatized status.
Furthermore, LGBT advocates have countered slippery slope argu-
ments by drawing a bright line between same-sex couples and multiparty
relationships,395 which may have furthered the stigmatization of poly-
amorous individuals. This strategy acquiesces to the unspoken message in
the conservative arguments: that multiparty relationships are of less value
than monogamous ones and undeserving of the sanctity of marriage. Thus,
the public discourse LGBT advocates have sparked around polyamory has
not been a debate, but rather a one-sided reinforcement of the dominant view
that polyamorous relationships are beyond the scope of accepted sexual mo-
res. This public positioning of LGB people as distinct from polyamorists—
and closer to the mainstream—may have furthered the stigmatization of
polyamorous communities. While (straight, monogamous) mainstream pub-
lic discourse rejecting polyamory reinforces dominant sexual norms, LGBT
community discourse rejecting polyamory adds additional texture to the hi-
erarchy of sexual norms and stigmatization. When LGBT advocates—them-
selves on the fringes of the mainstream—distance themselves from
polyamorists, the latter are pushed even further to the margins.396
In addition, same-sex marriage litigation may have increased the stig-
matization of polyamorous people by opening them up to conservative back-
lash—or “forelash,” given that polyamorists have yet to mobilize en masse.
Polyamory has been a constant focus of opposition to same-sex marriage,
figuring strongly in arguments made both inside and outside the courtroom.
394 See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Iowa Justices Hear Same-Sex Marriage Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 10, 2008, at A24, archived at http://perma.cc/Z35G-MND7 (opening with
the following sentence: “In a case that could make Iowa the first Midwestern state to
legalize same-sex marriage, the Iowa Supreme Court on Tuesday pressed lawyers for
both sides with sharp questions on topics like the 4,000-year-old history of marriage and
whether a ruling favoring gay couples would open the door to polygamy.”).
395 Transcript of Oral Argument at 46–47, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2013) (No. 12-144), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_tran
scripts/12-144a.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5YEK-UXTE.
396 Cf. Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1413–16 (2004) (arguing that the LGBT movement’s quest for
marriage further stigmatizes those who engage in sexual conduct outside committed, mo-
nogamous relationships).
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For example, the year after the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found
bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional,397 the Family Research Council
issued a pamphlet entitled “The Slippery Slope of Same-Sex Marriage.”398
After describing polyamory as a new front of the “movement to redefine
marriage,” the pamphlet argues that, like same-sex marriage, polyamory
“looms ahead for our society unless a bulwark is created in the form of a
constitutional amendment protecting marriage.”399 In 2008, another of the
major organizations leading the fight against same-sex marriage, Focus on
the Family, issued a similar statement raising the threat of polyamorist rela-
tionship recognition “on the heels” of LGBT movement victories in the
marriage realm.400 While this earlier attention to polyamory seems to have
been an offshoot of conservative efforts to hobble same-sex marriage, more
recent rhetoric indicates that conservatives are starting to focus on poly-
amory as an issue in its own right.401 It could be, as one polyamorous blogger
suggested, that conservatives are increasingly giving up the ghost on same-
sex marriage and are instead “turning their sights more directly onto the next
target down their slippery slope.”402
In raising the potential cultural consequences of same-sex marriage liti-
gation on a prospective polyamorous marriage campaign, we are not sug-
gesting that LGBT movement activists should be held responsible for these
consequences. Many of the consequences we mention, such as the media
attention to and conservative backlash against polyamory, have occurred in
areas outside the LGBT movement’s control. For the areas within activist
control, such as litigators’ strategic line-drawing and disassociation from
polyamorists, it is difficult to pass judgment without full awareness of the
competing pressures that motivated LGBT activists’ strategic decisions. The
397 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
398 TIMOTHY J. DAILEY, FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE (2004), http://downloads.frc.org/EF/EF04C51.pdf, archived at http://per
ma.cc/D9G9-QZEQ.
399 Id.
400 Focus on the Family Issue Analysts, Marriage, FOCUS ON THE FAMILY (2008),
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major point here, as throughout the Article, is to assess the legal and cultural
tools and obstacles that polyamorists are likely to encounter in the road
ahead. The discussion here specifies particular environmental changes that
have emerged from the LGBT movement’s marriage campaign, which may
hinder the viability of the favorable legal arguments that the LGBT move-
ment has simultaneously put into effect.
An additional contribution of this discussion is to help build under-
standings of the far-reaching effects that one social movement’s actions may
have (even inadvertently) on another social movement. This Article has
shown how the mainstream LGBT movement, which had almost no formal
engagement with polyamorous activists, has had profound implications for
that group and its potential for future mobilization. This idea of movement-
movement influence resonates with a large body of socio-legal work on so-
cial movement “spillover,” or the impact of previous social movements on
subsequent ones.403 In a foundational article investigating the influence of
the women’s movement on the U.S. peace movement, sociologists David
Meyer and Nancy Whittier identify four major types of social movement
spillover: the adoption of a previous movement’s political “frames”; the
spread of innovative protest tactics; the selection of leadership; and the im-
plementation of common organizational structures.404 One of the key mecha-
nisms that allows for these spillover effects to occur, according to Meyer and
Whittier, is when one movement achieves certain change in the external en-
vironment, which subsequently restructures the opportunities and challenges
available to the next movement.405 The present Article contributes to these
sociological insights by applying these theories in the context of social
movement legal mobilization. As a result, we identify different forms of
spillover that sociologists have largely ignored, including not only the doc-
trinal legal arguments presented in court, but perhaps more importantly, the
various cultural models of litigation that a movement can use to achieve
different extralegal goals (e.g., to the radical “litigation as protest” model
versus the more traditional impact litigation model). These socio-legal
movement strategies, which do not fit neatly into the categories of spillover
identified in Meyer and Whittier’s sociological work, suggest a more com-
plex type of spillover may be at play in legal mobilization.
An additional benefit of investigating social movement spillover in the
context of legal mobilization is that it allows for a more nuanced understand-
ing of the interrelated movement-inspired changes in both cultural and legal
environments, which subsequently shape future movements. Previous re-
search has tended to conceptualize a movement’s impact on its external envi-
ronment as either cultural or legal; cultural impact is usually defined as
403 Meyer & Whittier, supra note 24, 277–78. R
404 Id. at 278.
405 Id. at 281 (“The cultural changes promoted by a social movement affect not only
the external environment but also other social movements.”).
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spreading movement-related ideologies (e.g., feminist or antiracist ideals,
which future movements import),406 while legal impact may be measured by
winning precedent on particular legal arguments. Our approach in this Arti-
cle incorporates a socio-legal perspective into the idea of environmental
change, which sees law and culture as mutually influential and overlapping
spheres of social life. For example, in evaluating the potential spillover of
LGBT legal strategies, we have weighed not only their resonance with ex-
isting doctrine but also their cultural meaning and messaging effect. Simi-
larly, we have discussed how the numerous cultural effects of social
movement litigation can seep into and affect other communities’ possibilities
for legal mobilization. Our identification of these cultural effects of litigation
outside of a single litigating movement has opened a fruitful area for further
empirical exploration.
CONCLUSION
This Article has identified a common set of characteristics that the
polyamorous community today shares with the gay liberationists of the early
1970s who initially pushed for same-sex marriage—suggesting a ripe setting
for the diffusion of marriage equality strategies from the LGBT movement
to the poly context. We have also suggested that the LGBT movement’s
longstanding legal mobilization around issues of legal relationship recogni-
tion, both through marriage and other legal frames, has shaped the contem-
porary landscape for poly activism in ways that are likely to constrain the
cultural resonance of poly marriage, while simultaneously bolstering the le-
gal resonance of constitutional arguments for poly marriage. By examining
the potential strategy diffusion between these movements, and how the pos-
sibilities for such diffusion are partially contingent on the environmental
changes brought about by previous LGBT movement mobilization, this pro-
ject has forged a path for theoretical development around issues of social
movement spillover.
In addition to its theoretical contributions, this Article is useful for its
practical utility. Part III provides the first roadmap of issues, strategies, and
challenges that advocates can expect to see in the path toward polyamorous
marriage or other legal relationship recognition. Incorporated in our discus-
sion of potential poly strategies is a sensitivity to the interaction between the
legal and cultural implications of social movement litigation that is rare in
legal scholarship—especially in legal scholarship that aims to have a practi-
cal impact, as ours does. For instance, even as we outline several legal argu-
ments that have become accepted and endorsed by judges that would be
favorable to a poly marriage campaign, we have also identified the poten-
tially culturally problematic aspects of those arguments. Arguments in the
406 Id.
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post-Baehr same-sex marriage context, which continue to exalt marriage as
an intimate expression of identity and as a primary vehicle for family forma-
tion, may be strategically effective for winning in court, while simultane-
ously chafing those in the poly community who hope to “queer” marriage or
think more broadly about their community.
Along with the typical impact litigation strategies, the history of LGB
relationship recognition litigation provides several examples of litigation
strategies that may be better suited to the poly community’s nonlegal cultural
goals. The nonmarital relationship recognition approach may be more effec-
tive at reducing stigma against alternative family forms and building ties
with allied political movements, such as the movement to remove the mar-
riage election from the tax code and the movement for universal healthcare.
The “litigation as protest” approach—advocating for marriage before it is
legally viable—may be more effective at pointing out the discriminatory
effects of marriage laws and challenging the dominance of marriage as an
institution. While these alternative models for legal mobilization from the
LGBT context might not have been the surest winners in the courtroom (at
least initially), it is important to signal the opportunities they might present
for poly activists seeking other types of goals.
Thus, our practical roadmap for poly activists is unique in that it does
not assume that winning is, or should be, the purpose of poly marriage litiga-
tion. As the experience of the LGBT movement suggests, pursuing an ap-
proach that is narrowly targeted at legal reform will not always get at the
movement’s core motivations for litigating. Our purpose in tracing the multi-
ple models of relationship recognition mobilization in the LGBT context has
been to show poly activists how litigation can satisfy a range of movement
imperatives, from the formalistic, to the immediate and practical, to the
radical.
At this juncture, it is up to poly people to decide what is at the core of
their politics. Is it the affirmation and recognition of poly lifestyles that mar-
riage provides (an identity politics movement)? The freedom to define one’s
family and lifestyle without state interference (a liberal rights issue)? The
redistribution of social wealth to bridge the economic gap between state-
sanctioned couples and others, such as nonsexual co-parents, extended fami-
lies, care-giving relationships, and elderly companions (a social justice is-
sue)? In presenting the LGBT movement’s experience with multiple models
for legal mobilization, and showing how those models link with various un-
derlying motivations for legal change, our hope is not to direct the course of
poly advocacy, but rather to provide tools and perspectives for them to use
in constructing a nuanced and historically informed mobilization strategy—
if they so desire.
